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MORE REASONS FOR ABOLISHING FEDERAL

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 17(a): THE
PROBLEM OF THE PROPER PLAINTIFF

AND INSURANCE SUBROGATION
JUNE

F.

ENTMAN*

In this Article, Professor June Entman advocates the abolition of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), the realparty in interest rule,
using the problem of the properplaintiff in the insurance subrogation
context to demonstrate that the rule has created more problems than it
has solved. She points out that rule 17(a) is unnecessary because other
proceduraldevices are available to resolve theproperplaintiffissue. Professor Entman stresses that deciding who may assert a claim in federal
court is not merely an academic question. The correct answer is essentialfor a proper determination offederal diversityjurisdiction;even in a
nondiversity case, the correct answer is important because parties have
rights and obligations that nonparties do not have.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nobody likes the real party in interest rule.' Scholars began as early as
1921 to call for the rule's abolition, 2 and it has attracted no defenders. 3 Inertia,
however, can be a powerful force; the rule continues to exist in most states and
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). 4 Critics of the real party in interest
rule generally assert that it serves no useful purpose and only creates unnecessary confusion in identifying the proper party to assert a claim. 5 The confusion
6
in turn is harmful not only because of the resulting waste of judicial resources,
but also because an incorrect decision under rule 17(a) may result in a procedural rule interfering with the correct application of substantive law or with
policies of federal diversity jurisdiction. 7 The purpose of this Article is to
demonstrate that this criticism of federal rule 17(a) not only continues to be

valid, but also that the problems caused by that rule have multiplied in recent
years.
One area in which rule 17(a) has been particularly troublesome is the question of the proper plaintiff when the injured party's casualty insurer has compen1. The most common form of the rule is that found in the first sentence of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a): "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."

2. See Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Pleafor Its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV.
926, 926 (1957); Kennedy, FederalRule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51
MINN. L. REV. 675, 724 (1967); Simes, The Real Party in Interest, 10 Ky. L.J. 60, 72 (1921).
3. Even the Reporter who presided over the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which attempted to cure some of rule 17(a)'s defects, could muster only the faintest
praise: "[The rule] conveys a certain amount of correct information about naming plaintiffs, but to
the average reader innocent of history it probably suggests as much or more that is quite incorrect."
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 412 (1967).

4. See supra note 1. Professor Atkinson's suggestion that the rule be abolished in New York,
Atkinson, supra note 2, at 926, was honored posthumously by section 1004 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules, which became effective in 1963. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 1004 (MeKinney
Supp. 1990). Other states that have no "real party in interest" rule include New Hampshire, see
Atkinson, supra note 2, at 932, and Illinois, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-403 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989); Brosam v. Employer's Mut. Casualty Co., 61 Ill. App. 2d 183, 187, 209 N.E.2d 350,
352 (1965).
5. See Atkinson, supra note 2, at 957-59; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 724; Simes, supra note 2,
at 72; see also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 453 (4th ed. 1983)
(noting the criticism).
6. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir.
1973) (real party in interest rule permits "[ingenious counsel... to present yet another 'decision
point' resulting in extravagant expenditures of time and effort before ever reaching the merits")
(citing J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW, THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 65 (1969)), cert. denied, 415

U.S. 935 (1974); Simes, supra note 2, at 72 ("[T]he mass of litigation on the real party in interest

statute is but another illustration of the sort of 'much ado about nothing' which is all too frequent in
legal discussion.").
7. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 938-39 (discussing cases in which "counsel and sometimes even
the court have been misled into the belief that the real party in interest statute creates a substantive
right"); Simes, supra note 2, at 62-63. See generally Kennedy, supra note 2 (discussing the relationship between the real party in interest rule and diversity).
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sated him in whole or in part for the claimed loss.8 If the insurer, by virtue of
the compensation paid, has acquired rights in its insured's claim against third
parties, the issue arises whether the proper party to assert the claim is the insured, the insurer, or both.
A considerable amount of rule 17(a) jurisprudence has been generated by
this issue simply because parties are strongly motivated to litigate the proper
plaintiff issue when one of the possible choices is an insurance company. Conventional wisdom that juries are prejudiced against insurance companies encourages plaintiffs to present claims in the name of the insured alone.9 Conversely,
when insurers have an interest in the claim asserted, defendants demand that the

insurer be named as a party plaintiff. 10

The defendant's demand that the insurer be named may take the form of a
motion to dismiss for failure to name the real party in interest under rule

17(a), I1 a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join an "indispen-

8. Professor Atkinson notes that the real party in interest rule is not often cited except in
assignment, subrogation, and trust cases. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 958. See generally Annotation,
ProperPartyPlaintiff,Under Real Partyin InterestStatute, to Action Against Tortfeasorfor Damage
to Insured Property Where Insured [sic] Has Paid Part of Loss, 13 A.L.R.3I) 140 (1967) (partial
subrogation cases); Annotation, ProperParty Plaintiff,Under Real Party in Interest Statute, to Action
Against Tortfeasorfor Damage to Insured Property Where Loss is Entirely Covered by Insurance, 13
A.L.R.3D 229 (1967 & Supp. 1989) (total subrogation cases).
9. See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of Am. v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir.
1954) ("[Defendant's] real, its only concern was ... the possible prejudice which plaintiff might
suffer in the minds of the jury because of the knowledge that plaintiff was insured. Such a purpose is
neither a proper nor a legal purpose."); Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 88 F.R.D. 336, 338 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) ("there is a substantial risk of prejudice to an insurer which is forced to join as a plaintiff,
as the presence of an insurer may affect a jury's decision on the merits"); Public Serv. Co. v. Crane
Co., 48 F.R.D. 424, 425 (N.D. Okla. 1969) ("strong possibility" that presence of an insurance company as a party "will generate prejudice or favoritism in the jury process"); Thrasher v. United
States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167, 225 N.E.2d 503, 507 (1967) ("The law maintains the
fiction that the insured is the real party in interest at the trial of the underlying negligence action in
order to protect the insurance company against overly sympathetic juries."). But see Pace v. General
Elec. Co., 55 F.R.D. 215, 218-19 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ("We feel compelled to say a good word for
juries.... With the universality of insurance covering so many aspects of their lives, they show no
prejudice against the organization providing this service .... "); Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Swenson
Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 649 P.2d 234, 238 n.4 (Alaska 1982) ("We are not impressed by abstract claims of prejudice resulting from the jury's knowledge of partial coverage. Insurance is a
widely accepted fact of life."); 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 74.41(c), at 14-559 (1988) (referring to the concern about jury prejudice as a "bugaboo"). See
generally Kennedy, supra note 2, at 715 (concluding that regardless of joinder, the judge "ought to
inform the jury fully as to any subrogation interests in the plaintiff's claim" because "frank disclosure to the jury of the real interests involved is the only way to elicit good verdicts").
10. There are other reasons for objecting to the party named as plaintiff. A successful objection
may cause the dismissal of an action for lack of diversity jurisdiction. See Potomac Elec. Power Co.
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 54 F.R.D. 486, 490-91 (D. Md. 1972). Defendants object to nonjoinder of
a compensating insurer on the grounds that if the insurer is not named, the defendant will not be
protected by doctrines of res judicata from a subsequent suit by the insurer to recover its portion of
the claim. See id. at 492. The large number of rule 17(a) decisions dealing with compensating
insurers, however, most likely is attributable solely to the fear of, or desire for, jury prejudice. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Prudential Lines, Inc. v. General Tire Int'l Co., 74 F.R.D. 474, 474 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the insurer had paid the claim and become
subrogee, and was therefore the real party in interest). The motion under rule 17(a) also may be to
reduce the damages claimed to only the amount due to the named plaintiff-insured. See Wadsworth
v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.2d 64, 66 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court granted motion to reduce
the addamnum from $1,000 to $60). The objection sometimes is phrased in terms of "standing," see
Honey v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 63 F.R.D. 443, 446-47 (D.D.C. 1974) (because "plaintiff...
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sable" party under rule 19,12 or, if joinder is feasible, a motion to join a party

"needed for just adjudication" under rule 19(a). 1 3 Even if the issue is presented

as a joinder or dismissal question under rule 19, courts frequently begin their
inquiry with rule 17(a). 14 Should a court find initially that the nonparty is not a
"real party in interest" under rule 17(a), that is, not entitled to prosecute a claim
against the defendant with regard to the subject matter of the suit, the court
almost certainly will conclude that rule 19(a) does not require that party's joinder.15 Because the nonparty has no claim that he may assert against the defendant (the nonparty is not a "real party in interest"), none of the criteria for
compulsory joinder under rule 19 will be met.1 6 When a court concludes, on the
other hand, that the nonparty is entitled to assert a claim against the defendant
with regard to the subject matter of the suit, the court then must determine
17
whether the nonparty is one who must be joined, if joinder is feasible.
has demonstrated... sufficient injury in fact to give him a personal stake in the outcome of this
litigation, it can safely be said that he has standing to bring this action"), or as a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6), see DeWitt v. Quarterback Sports Fed'n, Inc., 45
F.R.D. 252, 252-53 (D. Minn. 1968) ("defendant has moved under Rule 12 to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the plaintiff is
not the real party in interest as required by Rule 17(a)").
12. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1983)
(defendant moved to dismiss on ground that the real party in interest was indispensable and could
not be made a party because diversity jurisdiction would be destroyed), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985
(1974). For discussions of rule 19's application to compensating insurers and its relationship to rule
17(a), see infra notes 17, 262-319 and accompanying texts.
13. See, eg., Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 88 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 142 (D. Minn. 1957). Defendants also often seek to
compel joinder under rule 17(a). See, eg., Wattles v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 82 F.R.D. 446, 447 (D.
Neb. 1979).
14. See, eg., Childers v. Eastern Foam Prods., Inc., 94 F.R.D. 53, 55 (N.D. Ga. 1982) ("If [the
nonparty insurer] is found to be the real party in interest under Rule 17, the focus shifts to Rule 19
to determine the remaining issue ofjoinder.") (citations omitted); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 54 F.R.D. 486, 489 (D. Md. 1972) (stating that rule 17 presents the preliminary
question whether the insurers are the real parties in interest).
15. See, eg., Strate v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 160 F. Supp. 296, 297-300 (S.D. Ind.

1958).
16. The provision of rule 19(a) that is most typically cited as requiring joinder of compensating
insurers compels joinder of a person who, when other conditions also are met, "claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). This is not to say that a person
necessarily cannot be a party "needed for just adjudication" under rule 19 unless he can state a claim
for relief with regard to the subject matter of the suit. See Burger King Corp. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 119 F.R.D. 672, 676 (N. D. Ill. 1988) (rule 19(a) "does not state that the absent
party must have an interest in the action; instead, it requires only that he have an interest 'relatingto
the subject matter of the action' ") (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)); Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public
Rights Exception to PartyJoinder, 65 N.C.L. REV. 745, 774-76 (1987). But see Kennedy, supra note
2, at 679-80 & n.23 (stating that the relationship between rules 17(a) and 19 "has not been fully
developed," but quoting Koepp v. Northwest Freight Lines, 10 F.R.D. 524, 527 (D. Minn. 1950), for
the proposition that "Rule 19(a) necessarily assumes that the parties who may be joined under it as
plaintiffs are real parties in interest").
In the context of this Article, however, unless the compensating insurer has the right to bring a
claim against the defendant, it is likely that none of the criteria requiring joinder under rule 19 will
be met. The most common argument for compulsory joinder of a compensating insurer under rule
19 is that unless the court requires joinder, the defendant will be subjected to multiple litigation
because of the nonparty's rights in the asserted claim. See, e.g., Childers, 94 F.R.D. at 57; Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 54 F.R.D. at 492. If the compensating insurer has no right to bring suit against the
defendant for the claim asserted in the action, this argument necessarily will fail.
17. Most commonly, but not always, courts resolve this issue under rule 19. See infra notes
262-319 and accompanying text. The rule 19 joinder question in cases contesting nonjoinder of a
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In many states, the issue of who should be the party plaintiff when the

claimant has been compensated by insurance is resolved by a specific rule or
statute, sometimes as part of a state's real party in interest or compulsory joinder
rule.18 In federal litigation, however, there is no ready answer. Federal courts
have sought guidance in both rules 17(a) and 19. Published opinions on the

issue reveal that rule 17(a), in particular, has created many more problems than
it has solved.
First, there is the problem of ascertaining the proper role of substantive

law-often state law-under federal rule 17(a). This problem, discussed in Section IV of this Article, concerns the traditional criticism of the rule: Because the
"real party in interest" is simply the person who is entitled by the substantive
law to assert the claim, 19 should not the court proceed directly to the substantive

law and ask whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted? If the plaintiff has no right under the substantive law, his claim should
be dismissed under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Does not the real party in interest rule merely distract one

from the only really significant issue-the plaintiff's right to assert the claim?
A second problem is deciding the effect of the court's finding that a person
not named as a plaintiff is a "real party in interest" within the meaning of the

rule. In short, does rule 17(a) require joinder of all "real parties in interest"? Is
it a rule of compulsory joinder? The discussion of this topic, found in Section V
below, examines federal decisions that interpret rule 17(a) in a way that creates

an overlap, and in some cases a conflict, between that rule and the federal compulsory joinder rule, rule 19.

Finally, an issue that has surfaced in recent years is whether a determination by the court that the party named as the plaintiff is not a "real party in
interest" will preclude the named plaintiff from proceeding with the action. It

once seemed clear that upon such a determination, the parties were required to
name the proper plaintiff or the court would dismiss the claim. Section VI of
partially subrogated insurer has deeply divided the federal courts, both before and after the 1966
amendment to rule 19. Compare Gas Serv. Co. v. Hunt, 183 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir. 1950) (joinder
of partially subrogated insurer is required) and Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp. 692,
695 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (Potter Stewart, Circuit Judge) (rule 19 requires joinder of partially subrogated insurer) with Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D. 319, 322 (S.D. Iowa 1965) (rule 19 does not
require joinder) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 144 (D. Minn. 1957) (rule
19 does not require joinder); compare Childers, 94 F.R.D. at 57-58 (rule 19 requires joinder) and
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 54 F.R.D. at 486 (insurer "indispensable" under rule 19(b)) with Prudential Lines, Inc. v. General Tire Int'l Co., 74 F.R.D. 474, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rule 19 does not
require joinder) and White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F. Supp.
1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (rule 19 does not require joinder), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir.
1978) and aff'd mem. sub nom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d
Cir. 1978).
The issue of whether rule 19 requires joinder of a partially subrogated insurer is beyond the
scope of this Article, but will be the topic of a future effort by this author.
18. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 17(a); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-403(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989);
IND. R. Civ. P. 19(e)(3); LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 697 (West 1981); ME. R. Civ. P. 17;
MASS. R. Civ. P. 17(a); Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(b); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1004 (McKinney Supp.
1990); OHlo R. Civ. P. 19(A)(3); PA. R. Civ. P. 2002(d); R.I. R. Civ. P. 17(a); TENN. R. Civ. P.
17.01; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-207 (1986); VT. R. Civ. P. 17(a); Wis. R. Civ. P. 803.03(2).
19. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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this Article, however, describes how the 1966 amendment to rule 17(a) has led
some federal courts to hold that a suit may proceed in the name of a party who
is not a proper plaintiff so long as the proper plaintiff "ratifies" the action.
Rule 17(a)'s interference with the proper naming of plaintiffs is more than
an academic concern. As discussed in Section VII below, naming the proper
plaintiff is essential in order for courts to decide correctly questions of federal
diversity jurisdiction. Even when federal jurisdiction is not at issue, the matter
of who is named as a party plaintiff is important because the federal procedural
system is premised upon the assumption that those named as parties have rights
and duties in the conduct of the litigation. For example, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as well as various federal statutes, provide for assessment of
costs and sanctions against a "party."'20 Federal rule 16 authorizes the court to
direct the "attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties" to appear at
pretrial and settlement conferences. 2 1 Similarly, both the discovery provisions 22
and the scope of injunctions 2 3 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure accord different treatment to parties and nonparties. Thus, failure to name the
proper party as plaintiff can circumvent, or at least unduly complicate, a procedural rule that by its terms applies only to a person with the status of a "party."
Some background is necessary before examining these problems. The next
two sections of this Article set out, first, the origins of the real party in interest
rule and its entry into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, second, an
overview of the substantive law of insurance subrogation, which determines the
rights of the compensated insured and the compensating insurer.
II.
A.

THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF RULE 17(A)

Origins and Meaning of the Real Party in Interest Rule

From the time of its adoption in 1938 until it was amended in 1966, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provided:
Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a
contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party author-

ized by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him the
party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute of the

United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another
shall be brought in the name of the United States. 24
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16(f), 37, 54(d), 68; see also Independent Fed. of Flight Attendants v.

Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989) (district court may award Title VII attorney's fees against party
intervenor not charged with Title VII violation, but only if intervenor's action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation).
21. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (en
bane) (federal rule 16 does not limit district court's inherent authority to require party represented
by counsel to attend pretrial settlement conference).
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (amended 1966), reprintedin 39 F.R.D. 84 (1966),
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The evolution of the real party in interest rule was thoroughly documented

in Professor Atkinson's 1957 law review article calling for the rule's abolition in
New York. 25 Professor Atkinson located the rule's origins in early nineteenth-

century differences between law and equity regarding whether the assignor or

the assignee should appear as the plaintiff in a suit seeking to enforce an assigned
claim. 26 Prior to the nineteenth century, common-law courts were hostile to
assignments because they considered choses in action to be unassignable. 2 7 Only
28
the assignor, who retained legal title to the claim, was permitted to sue at law.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the law courts had begun to

recognize the rights of an assignee and permitted an assignee to sue at law upon
the assigned claim, but only in the name of the assignor. 29 The assignee controlled the suit and was liable for costs. 30 The practice at law of naming a

merely nominal plaintiff was referred to as "use" or "name" practice; the plaintiff would be styled X (assignor) "for the use and benefit of Y (assignee)."' 3 1 In
the case of a partial assignment, however, the law courts did not permit the
assignee to sue, even in the name of the assignor, because the courts wished to
avoid subjecting debtors to more than one action on a single obligation. 32 Eq-

uity, on the other hand, recognized the equitable, beneficial interest of the assignee and permitted the assignee to sue in his own name. 33 Equity went so far
as to find the interest of the assignor of a fully assigned debt so nebulous that
only the assignee could appear to enforce the claim.34 In cases of partial assignment, equity, having the advantage of liberal joinder of parties, 35 allowed the

assignee to recover his share by suit in his own name if he joined the assignor in
36
the suit.

The term "real party in interest" first appeared in judicial decisions as a
description of equity's preference for the assignee as the party who should sue
25. Atkinson, supra note 2.
26. Id. at 927.
27. Id. at 935 n.61.
28. Id. at 934.
29. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 21, at 157 (2d ed. 1947) (noting that the exception to the common-law rule that only one having the legal right can sue was not
permitted in cases other than assignees, such as cestuis que trustent or those having an equitable
interest in land).
30. Atkinson, supranote 2, at 935; see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530, 540 (1933).
31. "The suit, though for the use of the insurer, must be in the name of the person whose
property was destroyed." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 1 F. Cas. 207 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1874) (No. 96); see United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381 (1949); J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 319 n.5 (1985).
32. Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J. 259, 266 (1925).
33. C. CLARK, supra note 29, § 21, at 157.
34. Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 260.
35. In equity, broad joinder of all interested parties was encouraged to prevent a multiplicity of
suits whenever possible and convenient. C. CLARK, supra note 29, § 56, at 348-55. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, equity's essentially permissive attitude toward joinder was combined
with the idea that equity should do complete justice by requiring the joinder of all persons, known as
"necessary parties," having an interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Hazard, Indispensable
Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255 (1961);
Kaplan, supranote 3, at 359; Reed, Compulsory Joinderof Partiesin Civil Actions, 55 MICH.L. REV.
327, 331-32 (1957).
36. Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 266.
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upon an assigned chose in action.3 7 The Field Code of 1848 conformed the
differing law and equity practices by creating the "real party in interest rple,"
mandating the equity practice of permitting an assignee to sue in his own
name.3 8 The Code eliminated the practice of the law courts in which the assignee brought suit in the name of the assignor.3 9 The language of the Field
Code, that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest," became substantially that of4 Federal Equity Rule 3740 and, finally,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). '

The plain language of the term "real party in interest" suggests that a suit
must be prosecuted in the name of the one who will benefit from the suit. It is
well settled, however, that a "real party in interest" is one who, under the sub-

stantive law, has the right to bring and control the action, and that this person is
not necessarily the beneficially interested party. 42 Thus, for example, when the

substantive law gives the exclusive right to assert and control a claim to an executor or a trustee who has no beneficial interest, the executor or trustee is the
'43
only "real party in interest."
The real party in interest rule was never meant to determine who was enti37. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 927.
38. The pertinent provisions of the Field Code are:
§ 91. Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as
otherwise provided in section 93.
§ 93. An executor or administrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly
authorized by statute, may sue without joining with him the persons for whose benefit the
suit is prosecuted.
FIRST REPORT OF NEW YORK COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS (1848). See generally Atkinson, supra note 2, at 928-32 (tracing the development of these provisions).
39. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 928; Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 262. Professor Kennedy suggested that the real utility of the Code rule permitting an assignee to become the named
plaintiff was to evade the common-law rule that prohibited a party from testifying. Kennedy, supra
note 2, at 676. He concluded that once this common-law prohibition was abandoned, the real party
rule became "substantially meaningless." Id.
40. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, Rule 37 provided in pertinent part:
Parties Generally-Intervention. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or
a party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with him
the party for whose benefit the action is brought.
226 U.S. 627, 659 (1912); compare supra note 38 (text of the Field Code).
41. See supra text accompanying note 20.
42. C. CLARK, supra note 29, § 22, at 160; 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1543, at 334 (2d ed. 1990) (the real party in interest is "the person
who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right"); Kennedy, supra
note 2, at 678 ("Thus the real party is the one with legal power to control the lawsuit and may be
different from the person who will ultimately be benefited if the suit is successful."); Simes, supra
note 2, at 61 ("The real party in interest is the one to whpm the substantive law of the case gives the
right to bring and control the action."). But see Note, Civil Procedure-InsuranceCompanies as
Real Parties in Interest, 46 Ky. L.J. 252, 257 (1958) ("It would be difficult to argue ... that the
insurance company is not a real party in interest since it is the party 'who will be entitled to the
benefits of the action upon successful termination thereof.' " (quoting Taylor v. Hurst, 186 Ky. 71,
74, 216 S.W. 95, 96 (1919))).
43. See 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 117.12 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].

1990]

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

tied to enforce 44
the claim. The rule was intended to do nothing more than deter
"use practice."
In its mandatory form, 4 5 the rule assures that one who has the
right to assert and control the claim will be named as the party plaintiff.46 But
the rule does not tell us anything about who that person is.
To raise the issue of whether the plaintiff is entitled to assert the claim
stated, other procedural devices are available. A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted will test whether
the named plaintiff is entitled to prosecute the claim stated in the complaint.
Thus, for example, if the beneficiary of an estate brings suit to enforce a claim of
the estate, and the substantive law gives an administrator the sole right to sue on
behalf of the estate, a court will grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6).
Nothing more is needed. 47 Another rule declaring that the proper plaintiff is
one who can state a claim for relief-which is all the real party in interest rule
48
does-adds nothing.
If the real party in interest rule were understood universally to mean no
more than it does, there would be little harm in having an explicit rule that the
44. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 935-36 (describing the assignor's purely formal connection with
the action and concluding that all that remained to be done was to abolish use of the assignor's
name, which "might easily have been accomplished without saying anything about the real party in
interest"); Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 262 ("Thus the change induced by this section is
formal only: a plaintiff who had been able to sue at law in the name of another and in equity in his
own name can now sue in his own name before a court administering both law and equity."). Professor Simes describes the real party in interest rule as having three parts: "(1) The real party in
interest is the one to whom the substantive law of the case gives the right to bring and control the
action. (2) The real party in interest must sue. (3) The real party in interest must sue in his own
name." Simes, supranote 2, at 61. He then concludes that "only the third part of the rule represents
any innovation," in that it "abolish[es] certain technical rules such as those providing for a 'use
plaintiff' in case of suit by the assignee of a chose in action." Id. at 61-62.
45. The rule also has existed in some states in a permissive form. Atkinson, supra note 2, at
933; see, eg., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210 ("Every action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest, .... "); see also Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. v. Concrete Equip., Inc., 394 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("Florida's 'real party in interest' rule is permissive only.").
46. In most cases, resolution of the issue of the plaintiff's right to assert the claim also will
resolve the plaintiff's right to control the conduct of the lawsuit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make this assumption in holding "parties" responsible for the conduct of litigation. See supra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Under some procedural devices, however, most notably the
class action and actions consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, a plaintiff who
is entitled to assert a claim may not have complete control over the course of the suit. See FED.R.
Civ. P. 23(d), (e); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.22 (2d ed. 1985).
47. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 31, at 320; Atkinson, supra note 2, at
960 ("If substantive principles of law are sufficient to indicate who should be sued, they are sufficient
to ascertain who should sue. No formula is needed in either case."); Clark & Hutchins, supra note
32, at 262; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 723-24.
48. With one exception, it makes little difference procedurally whether a court considers a motion to dismiss as a motion under rule 17(a) or under rule 12(b)(6). The exception is the effect of a
defendant's delay in asserting his objection to the right of the plaintiff to bring the action. Federal
rule 12(h) provides specifically that a defense of failure to state a claim may be raised as late as "trial
on the merits." Rule 17(a), on the other hand, provides no guidance as to the required timing of the
objection, and there is no clear rule with regard to waiver of the objection. See Sun Ref. & Mktg.
Co. v. Goldstein Oil Co., 801 F.2d 343, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1986) (real party in interest objection must
be raised with "reasonable promptness"); Hefley v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1982) (real
party in interest objection waived when not asserted until 16 days prior to trial); Truckweld Equip.
Co. v. Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 649 P.2d 234, 239 (Alaska 1982) ("The decision as to
whether or not the motion has been made timely is committed to the discretion of the trial judge.");
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 31, at 322; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 683-85.
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proper plaintiff to be named is one who has the substantive right to assert and
control the claim. Such a rule is consistent, in fact, with the federal procedural
system's assumption that to be named a "party" to a lawsuit means somethingthat it is the "parties" who are accountable for and have rights in the litigation. 4 9 Unfortunately, however, the rule is as often misunderstood as it is understood. It has become, in some cases, a rule of compulsory joinder50 and, in
others, a rule that authorizes suit in the name of a party who is not the proper
plaintiff under the substantive law. 5 1
B.

The "Exceptions" Clause and the 1966 Amendment

The proposition that nonbeneficially interested representatives such as executors and administrators may sue in their own names without joining the beneficially interested persons was expressed as an exception to the real party in
interest rule in the Field Code, 52 in Federal Equity Rule 37,53 and in the original
version of rule 17(a). 54 Professor Atkinson criticized this syntax because it gave
the erroneous impression that treating an authorized representative as a real
55
party in interest was an exception not consistent with the rule.
The "exceptions" clause actually did no more than reflect general substantive law. The purpose of the clause was to clarify that adoption of the equity
practice thatpermitted suit by the holder of an equitable interest did notprevent
suit by a legal title holder; nor did it require joinder of persons having only a
beneficial interest, who were otherwise not entitled to sue at all. 56 Indeed, the
beneficially interested persons associated with representatives listed in the clause
were persons, such as the beneficiary of a trust or the legatee or distributee of a

decedent, who typically had no right to sue under the substantive law and, for

that reason, were not "real parties in interest."5 7 Thus, the clause's purpose
simply was to make clear that the rule worked no change in existing substantive
law. Those representatives listed in the "exceptions" clause were entitled to sue
not because they were listed in that clause; rather they could sue because the
substantive law gave them that right.5 8 They are, therefore, "real parties in in49. See supra notes 20-23 & 46 and accompanying texts.
50. See infra notes 262-319 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 141-261, 334-63 and accompanying texts.
52. See supra note 38.
53. The federal equity rule differed from the Field Code provisions in the conversion of Field
Code § 93 into a clause following the main rule and the addition of "guardian" and "a party with
whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another" in that clause. See Atkinson,
supra note 2, at 930. Comparesupra note 38 (text of Field Code § 93) with supra note 40 (text of
Federal Equity Rule 37).
54. See supra text accompanying note 24 (text of original rule 17(a)).
55. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 937-38, 957. The drafters of the original rule 17(a) recognized
this problem but did not attempt to correct it. See Clark & Moore, A New FederalCivil Procedure1L Pleadings and Parties,44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1311 n.88 (1935) (noting that the clause "tended to
confuse the subject," but that "since the provision has received specific construction that is satisfactory it may be well to adopt Equity Rule 37 without substantial change").
56. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 960-61; Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 274.
57. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 957 ("cestui que trust, the distributee and the legatee do not
normally have a right of action against third persons"); Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 274.
58. See Simes, supra note 2, at 71.
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terest" and are not in any sense exceptions.
Professor Atkinson proposed that if New York retained the real party in

interest rule, the state at least should change the connection between the main
clause and the "exceptions" clause to remove the erroneous and confusing impli-

cation that the clause stated an exception to a supposed rule that the real party

in interest is the beneficially interested person.5 9 The 1966 amendment to federal rule 17(a) followed Atkinson's suggestion by eliminating the word "but"

and converting the "exceptions" clause into an independent sentence. 60 The
Advisory Committee did not cite Atkinson's article, but stated, "The minor
change in the text of the rule is designed to make it clear that the specific in-

stances enumerated are not exceptions to, but illustrations of, the rule."'6 1 Even
the Reporter, Professor Kaplan, however, was not entirely confident that the
change would correct the problem. Professor Kaplan wrote that the new first
sentence was "still susceptible of the erroneous reading" that the real party in
interest was the one beneficially concerned in the claim. 62
C

Relation Back Ratification, and the 1966 Amendment

Another feature of rule 17(a) that has contributed to the confusion about
the rule's proper role is the provision added in 1966 to provide for relation back
of an amendment correcting a defect in naming the real party in interest. 6 3 Because the question of who is a real party in interest is a matter of the substantive
law, a federal court will apply state substantive law in making the real party in

interest determination in regard to a claim arising under state law that is
brought in federal court. 64 The effect, however, of a finding that the plaintiff is

not a proper party to assert the claim remains a question of federal procedure in
federal courts. 65 Thus, when there has been a defect in naming the plaintiff,

federal law determines whether the complaint may be amended to correct the
59. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 958; see also Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 273-74 (referring to the exceptions clause as "the largest single cause" of confusion in real party in interest doctrine). For cases that have suffered from this confusion, see infra notes 320-33 and accompanying
text.
60. Thus, the first two sentences of the rule, as amended in 1966, provided:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is
brought; and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States.
FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a) Cf supra text accompanying note 24 (text of original rule 17(a)).
61. FED. R. Cv. P. 17(a) advisory committee's note (1966). The committee also added "bailees" to the list of real parties in interest who may sue alone for the benefit of another. See id.; see
also Atkinson, supra note 2, at 949-50 (discussing the bailee's right to sue under substantive law).
62. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 412 n.213.
63. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All Amer. Bus Lines, Inc., 179 F.2d 7, 10
(10th Cir. 1949); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 143 (D. Minn. 1957); 3A
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supranote 43, 17.07, at 17-49. State law also may be applied when
the court is merely enforcing a federal remedy for a traditional state-created right. J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 31, at 321.
65. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 453; Clark & Moore, supra note 55, at 1310.
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defect and also controls the effect of that amendment. 66

Prior to 1966, the Federal Rules did not specify whether an amendment of
a complaint substituting the proper plaintiff to correct a failure to comply with
rule 17(a) should be given relation back effect to avoid a statute of limitations
defense. 67 The 1966 amendment to the rule clarified this matter of federal procedure by adding a new concluding sentence:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been

allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the
68

-

action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
The 1966 amendment to rule 17(a) must be read in light of the parallel
amendment of rule 15(c), which provided for relation back of an amendment
changing the party "against whom a claim is asserted."' 69 Although the 1966
amendment to rule 15(c) by its terms does not apply to a change in the named
plaintiff, the advisory committee's note states that
the attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants
extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs. Also relevant
is the amendment of Rule 17(a) (real party in interest). To avoid forfeitures of just claims, revised Rule 17(a) would provide that no action
66. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953).
67. See Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F.2d 613, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (relying upon rule
15(c) to permit relation back of an amendment to substitute fully subrogated insurers as the parties
plaintiff).
68. 39 F.R.D. 84 (1966). The impetus for this amendment came from the Advisory Committee
on Admiralty Rules. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
In addition to the amendments of rule 17(a) discussed above, the rule was amended in 1988
solely for the purpose of "gender-neutralizing." 108 S.Ct. ccxii (codified at FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a)).
Thus, subsection (a) now reads in its entirety:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
brought; and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement
of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
69. Rule 15(c) as amended in 1966 provided in pertinent part:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is assertedrelates back
ifthe foregoingprovision issatisfied and, within the periodprovided by lawfor commencing
the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice
ofthe institutionof the action that he will not be prejudicedin maintaininghis defense on the
merits,and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of
the properparty, the action would have been brought against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (italicized language added in 1966).
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shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed for
70
correction of the defect in the manner there stated.
The advisory committee's mention of an extension of rule 15(c) "by analogy" to amendments changing plaintiffs could create some confusion, or at least
an overlap with rule 17(a). 71 Nonetheless, at least the 1966 amendment to rule
17(a) moots the issue of whether rule 15(c) applies to a change of plaintiff.72
Thus, the provision for relation back in rule 17(a) appears to be the only part of
the rule that has any unique or useful function.
If rule 17(a) were deleted in its entirety, however, it would be a simple
matter to preserve the relation back of amendments changing a named plaintiff.
Federal courts generally have been very permissive in permitting plaintiffs to

amend their complaints to avoid dismissal of the suit under rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. 73 All that would be needed would be some clarification
that the first sentence of rule 15(c) applies to an amendment changing the named

plaintiff, just as it does to any amendment other than a change of defendant. 74
The difficulty created by the sentence added to rule 17(a) in 1966 is not the
provision for relation back when a proper plaintiff is belatedly named. Rather,
the problem is the suggestion found in the text of the amendment that one can
cure a defect in naming the proper plaintiff by "ratification." 75 In recent years,
a few courts have seized upon the word "ratification" to justify proceeding with
a suit brought in the name of a person who is not a proper plaintiff, while the
party who actually has the right to assert the claim and who controls the litiga76
tion remains unnamed.
The idea of ratification came from admiralty, with its traditionally relaxed
approach to plaintiffs. It has been said, for example, that even a simple volun70. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note (1966).
71. See Wadsworth v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.2d 64, 66 (7th Cir. 1975) (relying upon
both rules 15(c) and 17(a) in permitting relation back of an amendment to add insurer as a party
plaintiff); Crowder v. Gordons Transp., Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 415-19 (8th Cir. 1967) (relying upon
both rules to permit relation back of amendment changing the representative capacity of the plaintiff); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 410-12 (noting that in the 1966 amendments, "[p]art of the problem"
of relation back of an amendment correcting the plaintiff "was being attacked by amendment of rule

17(a)").
72. See Raynor Bros. v. American Cyanimid Co., 695 F.2d 382, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1982); Note,
Amendments That Add Plaintiffs Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 671, 676-80 (1982).
73. See, eg., Czeremcha v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 724 F.2d
1552, 1556 (1lth Cir. 1984) (even after a complaint is dismissed, leave to amend should be granted
liberally).
74. The advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendment of rule 17(a) states that the relation
back should be permitted only in a case in which "determination of the proper party to sue is difficult" or in a case of "understandable mistake." FED R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee's note
(1966); see infra note 87. Such a requirement may have seemed advisable under rule 17(a) because
the 1966 amendment of that rule contains no limits upon the plaintiff's right to correct a defect in
pleading and have relation back. If courts handle the problem under rule 15, however, the same
limits that apply to any amendment will apply to an amendment changing the party plaintiff. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (leave of court or consent of adverse party required for amendments after a
responsive pleading is served, "and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires").
75. See supra text accompanying note 68.
76. See infra notes 334-63 and accompanying text.
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teer may institute suit against a carrier in admiralty to recover for loss or damage to cargo. 77 As long as the proper plaintiff or plaintiffs ratified the action

before judgment, recovery could be obtained. 78 In other words, admiralty did
not have a rule requiring that a real party in interest--one with a right under the
substantive law to enforce the claim-bring the action. This nonchalance has
been attributed to the numerous interests that may exist in a ship's cargo and to
the difficulty in some cases of ascertaining the parties entitled
to recover, at least
79
prior to the expiration of applicable statutes of limitation.
In 1964 the Advisory Committee on Admiralty Rules proposed the merger
of civil and admiralty practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Committee, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, recommended several amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to preserve, after the merger, certain distinct admiralty practices.8 0 The Committee
proposed that the following concluding sentence be added to rule 17(a):
No action for loss or misdelivery of, or damage to, maritime cargo, or
for general average contribution to such cargo, or for salvage, and no
action for personal injury or death governed by section 33 of the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act, as amended...
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder or substitution shall have the same effect as if the8 1action
has been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
Then, as the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules later explained, "So sound did this proposed amendment of the rule seem that when it
reached the Court it had been enlarged to cover all civil cases, not merely the
particular maritime actions, and in that form it was approved." 8 2 The soundness perceived by Professor Kaplan was that the relation back effect of the rule
would "prevent failure of action for reasons not going to the merits when the
defendant had been informed through
the institution of the action against him
'8 3
that rights were being asserted."
What apparently passed unnoticed, however, was that the provision for ratification, as an alternative to joinder or substitution, introduced into the rule a
practice that was fundamentally at odds with the rule's basic proposition that
77. 2A A. JENNER & J. Loo, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 53, at 6-11 (7th ed. 1989) [hereinafter BENEDICt].

78. Id. § 53, at 6-11 to -13.

79. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, Part I- Amendments to Effect Unification of Civil and Admiralty Procedure, Rule 17(a) advisory committee's note, 34 F.R.D. 325, 341-42 (1964) [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft]; see Saint Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 505 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.
1974).
80. Preliminary Draft, supra note 79, 34 F.R.D. at 331-36.

81. Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
82. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 411; see supra text accompanying note 68.
83. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 411. It is at least arguable that an amendment to rule 17(a) was
not necessary to achieve this purpose. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 84 The

practice of ratification reintroduces "use" practice-suit in the name of a nominal party for the use or benefit of the person who actually controls the litigation,
and who even may be the only one to benefit from it.8 5 This was the very 8prac6
tice, however, that the real party in interest rule was intended to abolish.
The legislative history of the 1966 amendment strongly suggests that the

drafters did not intend to revive "use" practice to sanction, at least outside admiralty, deliberate nonjoinder of a party who should be joined.8 7 The Advisory

Committee's Note states:
This provision keeps pace with the law as it is actually developing.
Modem decisions are inclined to be lenient when an honest mistake

has been made in choosing the party in whose name the action is to be
The provision
filed-in both maritime and nonmaritime cases ....
should not be misunderstood or distorted. It is intended to prevent

forfeiture when determination of the proper party88to sue is difficult or
when an understandable mistake has been made.
Recent decisions, however, allowing parties to use the ratification device
deliberately to avoid naming an insurance company as a plaintiff are inconsistent
84. The failure to appreciate the conflict between the real party in interest rule and admiralty's
ratification practice is evident in Professor Kaplan's comment that "[a]pparently something on the
order of a real party in interest doctrine applied in admiralty." Kaplan, supra note 3, at 411 n.209.
A writer on admiralty, however, does seem to have appreciated the conflict, remarking:
The admiralty principles discussed hereinabove in this chapter [with regard to proper parties and ratification in admiralty, see supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text] have been
established by the decisions of the courts over many years. The application of Rule 17(a)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure to admiralty cases is bound to affect the principles discussed but the extent of the impact remains for future decisions. Certainly, when possible,
the plaintiff named in a complaint should be the party who has suffered the loss. However,
it is sometimes impossible to ascertain what party has legally suffered loss of cargo until
after the time for suit will have expired and, in such cases, suit in the name of the shipper
from whom title has passed or in the name of a volunteer, may be the only practical course
to follow.
BENEDICT, supra note 77, § 53, at 6-15. Ironically, admiralty appears to have had more of an impact on civil procedure than vice versa.
85. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Note, Compulsory Joinder of Partial
Subrogees: Implicationsof the Alaska Rule, 1 ALASKA L. REv. 171, 177-78 (1984) (the provision in
rule 17(a) for ratification "actually encourages the device of use plaintiffs").
86. See supra notes 38-39,44 and accompanying texts. Professor Atkinson stated that abolition
of this practice was "the real party in interest statute's only real accomplishment." Atkinson, supra
note 2, at 946; see also United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381 (1949)
("Under the Federal Rules, the 'use' practice is obviously unnecessary, as has long been true in
equity.").
87. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text; see also 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, supra note 42, § 1555, at 417-18. Wright, Miller, and Kane explain:
The reference to "ratification" in Rule 17(a) seems to be a carryover from the original draft
of the sentence added in 1966, which was to apply only to certain maritime proceedings,

and probably was intended to adopt the procedure in salvage actions by which nonparties
seek their share of the recovered property. Nonetheless, some federal courts have interpreted the word to validate an arrangement by which the real party in interest authorizes
the continuation of an action brought by another and agrees to be bound by its result,

thereby eliminating any risk of multiple liability.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee note (1966); see also J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE &
A. MILLER, supra note 31, at 322 n.28 (stating that the key factors to be considered in permitting the
amendment are whether the delay will prejudice the defendant and whether the plaintiff has some
reasonable excuse for the error as to the real party in interest).
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with the expressed legislative intent that the 1966 amendment be available only

in cases of mistake.8 9 More importantly, the ratification device is inconsistent
with federal policies of diversity jurisdiction 90 and with the assumption in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the party plaintiff is the person in control
of the action and the person entitled to state the claim for relief sought in the
complaint. 9 1

The several problems created by rule 17(a)-confusion in identifying the
proper plaintiff, use of the rule to require joinder, and introduction of the ratification device-all can be illustrated by examining federal decisions concerning
the proper party plaintiff when the claimant has been compensated in whole or
in part by insurance. Before proceeding to this examination, one must understand the substantive law of subrogation that should be the starting point in
identifying the proper plaintiff. In fact, a general failure to appreciate the con-

siderable diversity in the law of subrogation has led federal courts to make many
poor decisions about the proper plaintiff when insurance compensation has
occurred.

92

III. THE MEANING OF INSURANCE SUBROGATION
The rights of a compensating insurer may arise by actual assignment from
the insured or by subrogation. 93 Subrogation is a remedial doctrine created by

courts of equity to prevent unjust enrichment. 94 When a party (the subrogee)
has discharged an obligation owed by another (the debtor) under such circumstances that the debtor would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the
discharge, the subrogee is given the rights that the original obligee had against
89. See supra text accompanying note 88; see also Clarkson Co. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 441 F.
Supp. 792, 797-98 (N.D. Ca. 1977) (ratification justified on grounds of difficulty of determining
proper plaintiffs); Hobbs v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish, 49 F.R.D. 176, 180 (W.D. La. 1970)
(when determination of the proper party to bring the action was not difficult and when no excusable
mistake had been made, then the last sentence of rule 17(a) is inapplicable and the action should be
dismissed); 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42, § 1555, at 415 ("A literal

interpretation of the last sentence of Rule 17(a) would make it applicable to every case in which an
inappropriate plaintiff has been named. However, the rule should be applied only to cases in which
substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid injustice.").
90. See infra notes 364-88 and accompanying texts.
91. See supra notes 20-23 & 46 and accompanying texts.
92. See infra notes 141-95 and accompanying texts.
93. Subrogation has been referred to as equitable assignment. Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32,
at 270 n.79. At one time it was common for there to be an actual assignment to the insurer upon its
payment to the insured, so that it made little difference whether the insured's rights were considered
from the standpoint of assignment or subrogation. Atkinson, supranote 2, at 943. In some jurisdictions, on the other hand, subrogation is not permitted for life and accident insurance or for medical
payments for a variety of reasons, including rules against assignment of personal injury claims, R.
KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(a) (Student ed. 1988). In such situations, insurers

have used "loan receipts" to avoid the prohibition against assignment and subrogation. Id.
§ 3.10(a), at 230 & n.41; see also Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
MICH. L. REV. 841, 858, 866-68 (1962) (distinguishing assignment and subrogation); Comment, The
Loan Receipt and Insurers'Subrogation-How to Become the Real Party in Interest Without Really
Lying, 50 TUL. L. REv. 115, 133 (1975) (discussing insurer's use of loan receipt to achieve reimbursement otherwise prohibited); infra notes 211-61 and accompanying text (discussing other uses of
loan receipts).
94. E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES 312-13 (5th ed.
1975).
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the debtor before the obligation was discharged. The procedure is called subrogation and the subrogee is said to be subrogated to the position of the original
95
obligee (the subrogor).
In the insurance context, a compensating insurer (the subrogee) is said to be
subrogated to the rights of its insured (the subrogor) against a party who has
caused the insured's loss. 9 6 An insurer's subrogation rights may be judicially
created, 97 may derive from the insurance policy or a settlement agreement with
the insured, 98 or may be provided by legislation. 99 At a minimum, a compensating insurer may be entitled to reimbursement from damages recovered from a
third party liable for the compensated loss. l10 The term "subrogation," however, typically implies much more. It means that the insurer has acquired all of
the rights of the insured-including the right to bring suit-with regard to that
portion of the insured's claim that the insurer has compensated. When the insurer is subrogated in this sense, the insured typically will have a duty to permit
the insurer to control enforcement of at least the insurer's portion of the claim,
to cooperate in its enforcement, and to refrain from prejudicing the insurer's
rights. 101 The insured, however, may retain control of his own uncompensated

portion of the claim, while the insurer controls the subrogated portion. 10 2 In
95. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 & comment a (1937).

96. R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 93, § 3.10(a), at 219. The collateral source rule,
prohibits reduction of a plaintiff's damages on account of benefits received from other
sources, is essential to achieving the subrogation goal of shifting the loss from the insurer to the
defendant. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REv.
1478, 1498-99 (1966).
97. Judicially created insurance subrogation arises from the more general equitable doctrine
and is sometimes referred to as "legal subrogation." R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 93,
§ 3.10(a), at 220.
98. This type of subrogation is sometimes referred to as "conventional subrogation." Id.
99. Id.
100. Depending upon the applicable subrogation rules, the allocation of recovery between insured and insurer will either give priority to the insured or the insurer, or require that they share pro
rata. Id. § 3.10(b)(1), at 233-37.
101. 6A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4096.25 (1972); 6A C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42, § 1546, at 354 (Supp. 1989) ("As a practical matter, of course,
the insurance company will control the prosecution of the lawsuit no matter in whose name it is
brought."). The extent of an insured's duty to cooperate was not well established by the courts, see,
eg., Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Home, 45 Tenn. App. 711, 326 S.W.2d 141 (1959); Coniglio v. Wyoming Valley Fire Ins. Co., 337 Mich. 38, 59 N.W.2d 74 (1953), but more recent insurance policies
have sought to specify the rights of the insurer and duties of the insured. For example, the "Business
Auto Coverage Form (1985)" provides:
5. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY AGAINST OTHERS TO US. If any
person or organization to or for whom we make payment under this Coverage Form has
rights to recover damages from another, those rights are transferred to us. That person or
organization must do everything necessary to secure our rights and must do nothing after
"accident" or "loss" to impair them.
R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 93, app. G, at 1113; see also id. at 1119 ("Trust Agreement"
clause in uninsured motorist part of "Family Combination Automobile Policy Form"); id. at 1129
("Our Right to Recover Payment" clause in "Personal Auto Policy"); id. at 1147 ("Subrogation"
clause in "Homeowners 4 Contents Broad Form").
102. See, eg., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Hogges, 67 N.J. Super. 475, 482, 171 A.2d
120, 124 (App. Div. 1961). Thus, an insured's release of a tortfeasor who has knowledge of the
insurer's interest generally will not bar the insurer from asserting its subrogation claim against the
tortfeasor. 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 101, §§ 4091-92; R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supranote 93,
§ 3.10(c), at 244. If a tortfeasor accepts a release in good faith without knowledge of the insurer's

which
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addition, there are also situations in which the insurer may have acquired the
right to control the entire claim, with a duty to reimburse the insured for
amounts recovered over the subrogated amount.10 3
The rights of the insurer, however, are not always so extensive. Under
some schemes, most notably (but not exclusively) workers' compensation acts,
the insured retains control of the entire original claim against the third party,
although the insurer may be entitled to a lien on the recovery and the insured
1° 4
may be deemed a trustee to the extent of the insurer's interest.

Finally, there are some situations in which both insured and insurer simulinterest, thus destroying the subrogation claim, the insurer may be entitled to recovery from the
insured. 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 101, §§ 4093-94; R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 93,
§ 3.10(c), at 244-47; see also id. § 3.10(c), at 243 (discussing the possibility that a court "might allow
the insured to settle with the alleged tortfeasor as to the insured's share of the cause of action without affecting the subrogated insurer's share of the cause of action").
Keeton and Widiss also discuss the situation of "reciprocal claims," in which the plaintiff's
insurer settles the defendant's liability claim against the plaintiff. The authors suggest that it is fair

to treat this settlement as a bar to the portion of the plaintiff-insured's claim against the defendant
that is subrogated, but not as a bar to the plaintiff's portion. Id. § 7.5(a)(2), at 800-01. Similarly, a
plaintiff-insured's settlement with the defendant should not bar the insurer subrogee's claim because
the claims are "independent" and "severable." Id. § 7.5(a)(3), at 802-03.
103. In Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 82 n.1 (4th Cir.
1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974), the insured, who retained a $150,000 pecuniary interest out
of a $2,200,000 claim, executed an agreement providing that the conduct of the action would be
under the "exclusive direction and control of the insurer." See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 9,

§§ 74.14 & 74.15 (identifying workers' compensation acts that establish a sequence in which either

the employee or the insurer first has the exclusive right to bring suit against a third party, and then,
after a specified time, the other has the exclusive right); Jenner & Tone, Pleading,Parties and Trial
Practice, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 612, 612 (1955) ("An insured under an automobile collision policy who
has collected for property damage under the policy ordinarily has no control over a subrogation
action brought subsequently in his name by the insurer under the subrogation provision of the policy."). When, however, because of a conflict of interest, the insurer is not likely to protect the

insured's interest, a court may permit the insured to bring and control his own suit. See Czaplicki v,
S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956). But see Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S.
596 (1981) (injured longshoremen, who offered no excuse for their delay, could not prosecute personal injury action against third party after right to recover had been assigned to employer by terms
of Longshoremen's Act, and it was not material that employers failed to pursue the assigned claims).
104. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 74.14 (identifying workers' compensation schemes in
which the employee has the exclusive right to bring suit for a specified period of time); see also
Cleaves v. De Lauder, 302 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. W. Va. 1969) (under West Virginia law the partially compensating automobile collision insurer's right is only a contingent interest in the litigation;
the insurer could not maintain an action in its own name); United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 278
N.W.2d 29, 30-31 (Iowa 1979) (when the insurance covers only part of the loss, the right of action
remains in the insured for the entire loss, the insured becoming a trustee for the insurer to the extent
of its payment and the insurer may not maintain an action against the tortfeasor); Krause v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 593, 169 N.W.2d 601, 604 (in a case of partial compensation, the insured retains control of the entire cause of action and is deemed to hold as trustee the
amount of the insurer's subrogation interest), modified, 184 Neb. 639, 170 N.W.2d 882 (1969).
When the insured otherwise has control of the claim, but fails to assert it, the insurer then may
be permitted to sue. See United Sec. Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d at 31 (Iowa 1979); City of New York Ins.
Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176, 186, 152 P.2d 836, 842 (1944) (insured should sue for itself and as trustee
for the insurer, but if the insured refuses to sue, "justice requires that the insurer be permitted to
bring action"). Cf Joyner v. F & B Enters., Inc., 448 F.2d 1185, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (under
the Longshoremen's Act, a consequence of the employee's bringing suit is that the compensating
insurer has no substantive right against the tortfeasor).
There do not appear to be any situations in which an insured who has received total compensation retains control of the claim. See Brinkerhoff v. Swearingen Aviation Corp., 663 P.2d 937, 94142 (Alaska 1983) (When amounts owner received in insurance and salvage equalled the value of the
lost aircraft, owner is not entitled to further recovery from defendant, even though defendant settled
with owner's insurer for less than amount insurer paid owner. Owner did, however, retain valid
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taneously are entitled to assert the entire claim, or the insured is entitled to
assert the entire claim while the insurer is permitted to assert the subrogated

portion. Generally in these situations joinder of both insured and insurer is required 10 5 or else the filing of suit by one will preclude suit by the other. 106
IV.

FINDING THE PROPER PLAINTIFF

Federal courts called upon to determine the proper plaintiff as between a
compensated insured and his insurer unfortunately often have failed to appreciate the wide variety of applicable substantive law. Many courts merely consider

an insurer "subrogated" whenever it may be entitled to reimbursement. Then,
having so labeled the insurer, and without further examination of the insurer's
rights under applicable law, the courts conclude that the insurer is a "real party
in interest" under rule 17(a). 10 7 Similarly, when the insured retains any pecuniary interest in the claim, courts readily conclude that the insured is a "real party
in interest."10 8 The courts fail to address what ought to be the crucial question-who is entitled under the substantive law to maintain and control an action against the third party.109
The problem is most pronounced when, as is most often the case, the incause of action for prejudgment interest for period extending from date of accident to date of his
recovery from his property insurer.).
105. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 74.13, at 14-371 to -375. Larson discusses cases construing workers' compensation statutes to "give a right to the employer [or its insurer] without
taking anything away from the employee, with the result that the subrogation or assignment has the
effect of creating parallel rights of action which may be asserted by either employer or employee."
Id. § 75.42, at 14-622 to -623. Many of these cases hold that although the employee may still sue
after the insurer's rights arise, joinder of the insurer may be required in the employee's suit. Id.
§ 75.42, at 14-623 n.21. See Lucas v. Durabond Prod. Co., 510 F. Supp. 999, 1000-01 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (lamenting that "many justifiable and fair settlements of plaintiffs' claims" have been
"wrecked by the counsel whose prime concern was the subrogation lien rather than the plaintiff's
true interests").
106. Courts not requiring joinder although both insured and insurer have a right to sue explain
that these parallel actions are not unfair to the defendant because, under the applicable statute only
one judgment, which would bind both employee and insurer, was permitted. King v. Cairo Elks
Home Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 681, 683-86 (E.D. Ill. 1956) (describing rights of employee and insurer as
"coextensive and independent" during the three months prior to expiration of the statute of limitations period, when either the employee or insurer could sue a third party under the workers' compensation act); Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D. 267, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1957). In
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc. v. Needles, 360 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1962), the court stated that
either the employee or the employer (or both together) may sue the negligent third party
for all elements of the employee's damages, and whichever brings the action becomes the
trustee of an express trust for the benefit of the other ....
Actually, while the word
'subrogated' is used . . . it is indemnity, and not true subrogation, for which the act
provides.
Id. at 386.
Larson concludes that while this type of scheme avoids the problem of a subrogee-insurer with
no incentive to protect its subrogor-insured's interests, it still gives "some advantage to the carrier in
that, with its superior facilities and experience, it is apt to be the more alert and aggressive in launching the action." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 74.16(b), at 14-389. He further notes that "there
may be some advantage of simplicity in having only one cause of action in existence at a given time,
and in knowing exactly whose it is." Id.
107. See infra notes 141-69 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 170-95 and accompanying text.
109. Some federal courts, even after the adoption of rule 17(a), continued to authorize "use"
practice. Grace v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174, 178 (D. Md. 1948) (In general, "suit must be
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surer has only partially compensated the insured for the loss. When the insurer
has fully compensated the insured, federal courts generally hold correctly that
the insurer is the only "real party in interest" under rule 17(a). 110 These decisions are correct because it is a virtually universal rule of subrogation that an
insured who has received total compensation no longer has any rights in the
claim. 111
The case of partial subrogation under federal rule 17(a) has been more difficult than that of full compensation because of the variety in the substantive law
of subrogation, 112 as well as the esoteric nature of the real party in interest rule.

The erroneous approaches in federal decisions involving partial compensation by
an insurer fall into three "problem" categories. First, many courts, failing to
understand the real party in interest rule, have found that either the insured or
the insurer is a real party in interest under rule 17(a) solely on the basis of that
person's pecuniary interest in the claim. 113 Second, when applying state law to
determine who is the real party in interest under rule 17(a), courts sometimes
have failed to distinguish a state's procedural provisions from its substantive law
of subrogation. 114 Third, federal courts' attempts to apply rule 17(a) to cases in
which there is a loan receipt transaction between insured and insurer create a
problem that contains both of the difficulties mentioned above, but also has its
own unique features. 1 15
brought in the name of the person who has sustained the damage but with the notation that suit is
also for the use and benefit of the insurer.").
110. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81 (1949). See generally
Annotation, ProperParty Plaintiff,Under Real Partyin Interest Statute, to Action Against Tortfeasor
forDamage to InsuredProperty Where Loss is Entirely Covered by Insurance, 13 A.L.R.3D 229 (1967
& Supp. 1989) (collecting federal and state cases).
11. See supra note 104. Insurance companies, of course, are not pleased with the result that
suit must be brought in their own names. Consequently, in many states there are specific procedural
provisions for suit in the name of the insured even when there is total subrogation. See IND. R. Civ.
P. 19(e)(3); ME.R. Civ. P. 17; MASS. R. Civ. P. 17(a); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 1004 (McKinney
Supp. 1990); PA. R. Cr%'. P. 2002(d); R.I. R. Civ. P. 17(a); TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.01; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-207 (1986); VT. R. Civ. P. 17(a); Catalfano v. Higgins, 55 Del. 470, 473, 188 A.2d 357, 358
(1962); Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. v. Concrete Equip., Inc., 394 So. 2d 193, 195-96 (Fla. App. 1981);
Montello Shoe Co. v. Suncook Indus., Inc., 92 N.H. 161, 161-62, 26 A.2d 676, 676-77 (1942). Provisions permitting the insurer to control the action but to bring suit in the name of the insured also
have appeared in some workers' compensation statutes. See, e.g., King v. Cairo Elks Home Ass'n,
145 F. Supp. 681, 683 (E.D. Ill.
1956). Insurance companies also have developed the use of the loan
receipt device to avoid being named as a plaintiff even when subrogation is total. See infra notes 21161 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text. There also has been, from the time of Code
pleading, a variety of procedural treatments among the states. Under the Codes, some states interpreted their real party in interest rule to mean that in a case of partial subrogation, either the insurer
or the insured may sue, but joinder of both may be required. Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at
272. Other states held that when the insured was only partially compensated, the suit not only
could, but must, be in the name of the insured alone. Id. at 272-73. The variety of interpretations of
the real party in interest rule continues today, see Annotation, ProperParty Plaintiff, Under Real
Partyin InterestStatute, to Action Against Tortfeasorfor Damage to Insured Property Where Insured
[sic] Has PaidPart ofLoss, 13 A.L.R.3D 140 (1967 & Supp. 1989), although some states have dealt

with the issue specifically in a rule or statute. See supra note 18.
113. See infra notes 141-95 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
115. See infira notes 211-61 and accompanying text.
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A. Misunderstandingthe Real Party in Interest Rule
1. The Aetna Case and Moore's FederalPractice
A leading United States Supreme Court decision and an influential treatise
relied upon in that opinion have contributed particularly to the first problem,

the tendency to find real party in interest status solely on the basis of pecuniary
interest in the claim. The case is United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.,1 16 and the treatise is Moore's FederalPractice.117 Professor Moore 118 discussed partial subrogation and the real party in interest rule in the 1948 second

edition of his treatise, stating:
For example, if the insurer satisfies his liability to the insured, but the
insured sues and recovers his entire original loss, the recovery is impressed with a trust for the insurer up to the amount to which he was
entitled by principles of subrogation. The insurer, therefore, owned
that portion of the substantive right, and the insured owned the remainder. There are two real parties in interest and either or both may
sue .... 119
This passage fails to distinguish a right to reimbursement from a right to
bring suit. It concludes that an insurer "owns" a substantive right, and there-

fore is a real party in interest, merely because the insurer has a right to reimbursement. But a right to sue and a right to reimbursement are not the same. 120
The weakness in the passage's reasoning is highlighted by the reference to the

insurer's trust interest in the insured's recovery. The beneficiary of a trust generally is not entitled to sue and accordingly is not a real party in interest. If the

insurer's interest under the substantive law is actually a trust interest, that fact
alone demonstrates that the insurer properly would not be considered a real
party in interest. Only if the insurer establishes its right to sue, not merely a
beneficial interest, may a court correctly conclude that the insurer is a real party
116. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
117. There have been two editions of Moore'sFederalPractice. The first edition was published in
1938 and rules 17(a) and 19 are discussed in volume 2 of that edition. 2 J. MOORE & J. FRIEDMAN,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 17.01-17.14, 19.01-19.05 (1938). The second edition was published originally in 1948 and the discussions of rules 17(a) and 19 appear in volume 3A of the current
version of that edition. 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, %%17.01-17.15, 19.0119.21. The second edition, however, is in a loose-leaf form and has been continuously revised since
1948. It is not possible, therefore, to locate with certainty the text of the treatise that is referred to in
early citations to the second edition of Moore's FederalPractice. Thus, there is no way to identify
the text referred to by the Aetna Court's citations to "3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.) p. 1339"
and "3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.) p. 1348." See Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381-82.
118. Professor James William Moore served from 1935 to 1938 as Chief Research Assistant on
the staff of Dean Charles E. Clark, Reporter to the Civil Advisory Committee. Moore became a
member of the Committee in 1953. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, %1.02a[l], at 113 n.l. From 1944 to 1948, Professor Moore served as consultant to the revision of the Federal
Judicial Code. 2 WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 2357 (41st ed. 1980).
119. 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, % 17.0912.-I] at 17-78. Although the
treatise is continuously updated, see supra note 117, the section cited here begins with the following
notation: "The discussion in this subhead was approved by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co ..
" Id. at 17-77 n.1. The passage also appears, with some differences in
syntax, in the first edition of Moore's treatise. 2 J. MOORE & J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, § 17.08,
at 2057.
120. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
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12 1
in interest.

Moore went on to state that "[i]t has been properly held that since the
partial subrogee is a real party in interest, a suit by him alone states a cause of
action, the only defect being that of parties .... ,"122 Moore's approach here is
identical to that decried by Professor Simes many years before: "Instead of going to the heart of the matter and deciding why the substantive law gives a
litigant a right, courts have dodged behind [the real party in interest] statute and
said, 'Oh, well, anyway he is the real party in interest, so, of course, he can
sue.'"123 Nonetheless, Moore's discussion was influential when the United
States Supreme Court for the first time discussed rule 17(a) and the issue of
insurance compensation.
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.124 has become the landmark
decision for the problem of proper parties under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in cases involving compensating insurers. It is an unfortunate landmark.
Although there is probably nothing wrong with the holding in the case, the decision's treatment of the rule 17(a) issue is dreadfully superficial and misleading.
In each of four cases consolidated for appeal in Aetna, an insured allegedly
had been injured by the negligence of a federal government employee. 125 Each
of the injured parties' insurers brought suit against the United States pursuant to
the Federal Tort Claims Act 126 to recover the amounts each had paid to compensate the injured parties. 1 27 The predominant issue was whether each insurer's claim was prohibited by the Anti-Assignment Statute, which barred
"transfers and assignments" of claims against the United States. 128 The Court
framed the issue as whether an insurance company may "bring suit in its own
name against the United States upon a claim to which it has become subrogated
29
by payment to an insured who would have been able to bring such an action.',
In determining the right of subrogees to sue under the Tort Claims Act, the
Court first held that the Anti-Assignment Statute did not bar assignments by
operation of law, such as subrogation, and that Congress did not intend to exclude subrogation claims from the Tort Claims Act.130 Thus, the Court concluded that "the Government must defend suits by subrogees as if it were a
131
private person."'
The Court then turned to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) and stated:
[O]f course an insurer-subrogee, who has substantive equitable rights,
121. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
122. 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, %17.09[2.-1] at 17-79.

123. Simes, supra note 2, at 72.
124. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
125. Id. at 368-69.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 931 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (West 1965 & Supp. 1989)).
127. In case number 36, both insured and insurer had sued to recover their respective interests.
In case numbers 35, 37, and 38, the insurers alone had sued to recover the amounts paid to their
insureds. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 368-69.
128. 31 U.S.C. § 203 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1982)).
129. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 368.
130. Id. at 373-80.
131. Id. at 380.
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qualifies as [a real party in interest]. If the subrogee has paid an entire
loss suffered by the insured, it is the only real party in interest and
must sue in its own name. 3 Moore, Federal .Practice (2d ed.) p. 1339.
If it has paid only part of the loss, both the insured and insurer (and
other insurers, ifany, who have also paidportions of the loss) have subagainstthe tortfeasorwhich qualify them as realpartiesin
stantive rights
interest.132
The difficulty with the Court's discussion is that it seems to say that subrogation-a right to sue-flows ineluctably from the fact of payment by the insurer. The Court makes no reference to the intermediate and necessary step of
determining whether the underlying substantive law gives the compensating insurer (or retains for the partially compensated insured) such a right.
The Court's cursory discussion is understandable because the predominant
issue in the case was the effect of the Anti-Assignment Act 133 and also because

the defendant apparently did not dispute that the plaintiff insurers were subrogated.' 34 The Court's statement in dictum, however, that a partially compensated insured would qualify as a real party in interest, 135 was plainly wrong in at
least one of the cases before the Court. In stating the facts at the beginning of
the opinion, Justice Vinson noted that in one of the consolidated cases, Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, the plaintiff insurer was the workers'
compensation carrier of the injured party's employer. 136 Justice Vinson observed that the insurer claimed to be entitled to sue under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, which provided that when an injured employee who
had been compensated by a workers' compensation insurer failed to commence
an action within one year after the accident, "his inaction operated ... as an
assignment to the insurer of his cause of action."' 137 In such a case the employee-insured, deemed to have assigned his claim, would not be entitled to sue
would not properly be considered a real party in interest under
and, therefore,
13 8
rule 17(a).
132. Id. at 380-81 (emphasis added). As explained above, supra notes 117 & 119, the Aetna
Court's citation to Moore's FederalPractice is to text that cannot be located certainly, but which
apparently appears in the current version at 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43,
17.09[2.-1], at 17-78.
Regarding the compulsory joinder issue, the Court stated, "Under the Federal Rules, the 'use'
practice is obviously unnecessary ....No reason appears why such a practice should now be required in cases of partial subrogation, since both insured and insurer 'own' portions of the substantive right and should appear in the litigation in their own names." Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381; see also
supra note 17 and infra notes 262-319 and accompanying text (discussing compulsory joinder of
partially subrogated insurers).
133. The resolution of this issue takes up 10 pages of Chief Justice Vinson's 16-page opinion. See
Aetna, 338 U.S. at 369-80.
134. Id. at 368-69.
135. Id. at 381.
136. Id. at 368.
137. Id. The other three cases before the Court concerned property damage and the Supreme
Court's opinion contains no discussion at all of the substantive law creating the insurer's right to sue
in those cases. See id. at 367-69.
138. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 338
U.S. 366 (1949) (Insurer is the only real party in interest because the "New York statute gives it
alone the right to sue, even though it may have to account for part of the recovery to the injured
employee.").
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Thus, although on the facts of the case before it the proper plaintiff was
before the Court, the Court's carelessly phrased dictum about the real party in
interest rule unfortunately states a principle that would have produced an incorrect result if the action had been brought by the insured. Although the insured
certainly had a pecuniary interest in the claim, proper application of the substantive law of New York under rule 17(a) would have denied the insured the
right to sue, in spite of the Court's broad statement that partially compensated
13 9
insureds have substantive rights that "qualify them as real parties in interest."
More unfortunately, the Aetna dicta and the cited passage from Moore's
FederalPractice did not go unnoticed. Many courts fell into assuming, without
analyzing applicable substantive law, that in a case of partial compensation, the
pecuniary interests of insured and insurer rendered them both "real parties in
14
interest" under rule 17(a). 0
2.

Insurers as Real Parties in Interest

Under general casualty insurance, compensating insurers usually will qualify as real parties in interest because they have secured for themselves the right
to subrogation, including the right to bring suit to enforce their reimbursement
interest. Workers' compensation insurance, on the other hand, is regulated by
statute and often does not permit the insurer, at least initially, to have control of
the insured's claim against a third party.14 1 For this reason, it is in the workers'
compensation area that courts have had the most difficulty in applying rule 17(a)
to compensating insurers. In each of the following three cases, the court addressed whether the action could proceed in the absence of an insurer that had

partially compensated the plaintiff. In each case, the court's reliance on Aetna
produced a flawed analysis. Unfortunately, the opinions are written so that one
often cannot tell whether the courts were relying upon Aetna for purposes of
applying rule 17(a), rule 19, or both rules.
For example, in Wright v. Schebler Co.142 a federal district court decided
that a workers' compensation insurer was a real party in interest because provisions of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act gave the insurer a lien on the
employee's recovery and the right to join as a plaintiff in the employee's action. 143 The court did not discuss whether and to what extent the insurer otherwise was entitled to bring suit against the third party. Rather, the court based
its decision that the insurer was a real party in interest under rule 17(a) upon its
finding that the insurer had "a substantive right which is legally protected under
Illinois law."' 144
139. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381; see supra text accompanying note 131.
140. See infra notes 142-58, 170-85 and accompanying texts.
141. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
142. 37 F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965).
143. Id. at 321. The court, nevertheless, denied the defendant's motion to join the insurer as a
plaintiff. The court cited Aetna for the proposition that the defendants would be entitled "at the
time of trial... to indicate the interest of [the insurer] in plaintiff's claim." Id. at 322 (citing Aetna,
338 U.S. at 382); see infra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
144. Wright, 37 F.R.D. at 321. Contra Race v. Hay, 28 F.R.D. 354, 357 (N.D. Ind. 1961)
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Similarly, in Poleski v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc.145 another federal
district court ordered joinder of an insurer as a party plaintiff because the insurer was "a party for whose benefit [the] action is brought. ' 14 6 This ruling was
particularly curious because the insurer's obligation had arisen from the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and the court noted that
by paying compensation without an award under the Act, the insurer had foregone its right to control the employee's right of action, although it retained a
right to reimbursement. 147 The court even reserved judgment on whether and
to what extent counsel for the insurer would be permitted to participate in the
trial. 148 Even more curious, in light of the court's reliance on the Aetna decision, is the court's suggestion that it would be permissible to join the insurer as a

"use" plaintiff. 149

In Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co.150 the federal court considered the
New York workers' compensation law under which the insurer had a right to

reimbursement and a lien on the employee's recovery, but had no right to sue
unless the employee failed to do so within a specified time, in which case the

employee's failure would operate as an assignment of the employee's claim to the
insurer.15 1 The court noted that the statutory conditions for an assignment had
not occurred. 152 Nonetheless, the court cited Poleski, stating, "It is the rule in
this district that where such a right of reimbursement exists, a motion on the
part of a defendant to make the person entitled to reimbursement appear as a
154
party plaintiff should be granted." 15 3 Relying upon both Aetna and Poleski,
the Baltimore Transit court concluded that the insurer was a real party in interest who had to be joined because the insurer "has not only a right of reimbursement but, indeed, a lien on any proceeds of recovery, so that [the insurer] is
manifestly a person for whose benefit the instant suit is brought." 155
The Wright, Baltimore Transit, and Poleski courts all failed to appreciate
that a beneficially interested person is not necessarily a real party in interest and
that a real party in interest is one who has the right to enforce the claim, not
merely to benefit from it. Just because a person has a "legally protected" right,
or will benefit from recovery in a lawsuit, does not mean that this person is a real
party in interest. Beneficiaries and legatees, for example, are persons who have
(insurer under Illinois workers' compensation act is not a real party in interest if employee has
brought suit).
145. 21 F.R.D. 579 (D. Md. 1958).
146. Id. at 581. The court cited Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381, for the proposition that the insurer "is a
necessary party, and may be brought in on motion of the defendant." Id.
147. Id. Contra Hawkins v. United Overseas Export Lines, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 138, 141 (D. Md.
1980) (employer or insurance carrier is not a real party in interest under the Longshoreman's Act
during the six months that the longshoreman can bring a third-party action).
148. Poleski, 21 F.R.D. at 582.
149. Id.; see supra note 132.
150. 37 F.R.D. 34 (D. Md. 1965).
151. Id. at 35-36.
152. Id. at 36.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 37.
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legally protected rights and who may benefit, but who, nonetheless, are not enti15 6
tled to bring suit against third parties and are not real parties in interest.
Trustees and executors, on the other hand, are real parties in interest because
they are entitled, even required, to pursue the claim.157 The proper focus, not
understood by these three courts, is on the person's entitlement to enforce his
1 58
interest or right against the defendant.
Other federal courts, however, have appreciated these distinctions. For example, in Strate v. NiagaraMachine & Tool Works 159 the court noted that under
the Indiana workers' compensation statutes the compensating insurer was permitted to bring suit against the tortfeasor only if the employee failed to bring an
action within two years. 160 If the employee brought a timely action, as he had in

this case, the insurer's rights were limited to protection of its lien on the recovery. 1 6 1 The insurer was permitted to intervene in the employee's action, but
t 62
only for the purpose of protecting its interest postjudgment.
The Strate court distinguished Aetna by noting that in those consolidated

cases, "the applicable law operated to subrogate the insurer to the rights of the
plaintiff."1 63 Under the Indiana statute, on 'the other hand, the insurer was not
subrogated because it had no right of action against the third party; it was "only
a potential subrogee."'6 Consequently, the insurer was not a real party in inter165
est under federal rule 17(a).

The proper analysis under a different substantive law may lead, of course,
to the opposite conclusion regarding the real party in interest status of the com156. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
157. Id.

158. Another similarly poorly reasoned opinion is Blacks v. Mosley Mach, Co., 57 F.R.D. 503

(E.D. Pa. 1972), inwhich the court ordered joinder of a workers' compensation insurer without any
reference to the real party in interest rule and without analyzing the insurer's rights with regard to
the insured's claim. Id. at 505. The court even noted that the insurer was not in control of the
litigation, but nevertheless ordered joinder on the basis of rule 19(a) solely because the plaintiff's and
the insurer's interests were "identical, i.e. if the defendant is found liable, plaintiff will recover money
damages and [the insurer] will recover its Workmen's Compensation lien." Id. at 506.
159. 160 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
160. Id. at 299; see 2A A. LARSON, supranote 9, § 74.14 n.71.1 (identifying similar provisions in
22 states and under the Longshoreman's Act as amended in 1984).
161. Strate, 160 F. Supp. at 299.
162. Id. at 298-99; see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 74.41(c), at 14-559 ("The right of the
carrier to intervene in the employee's suit does not necessarily carry with it the right to participate in
the conduct of the suit without the consent of the employee."); see, e.g., Gorrell v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 189 Kan. 374, 378, 369 P.2d 342, 345 (1962) (Workers' compensation carrier was permit.
ted to intervene only to protect its lien, but not to participate in the lawsuit proceedings. The
statutory right of the carrier to bring an action was contingent upon the employee's failure to do so
within one year.).
163. Strate, 160 F. Supp. at 297.
164. Id. at 299.
165. Id. at 300; accord Hawkins v. United Overseas Export Lines, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 138, 141
(D. Md. 1980) (employer or insurance carrier is not a real party in interest under the Longshoreman's Act during the six months that the longshoreman can bring a third party action); McCoy v,
Wean United, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 491, 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (district court denied defendant's motion
to require joinder of plaintiff's employer's compensation carrier because, under Tennessee law, the
carrier had a subrogation lien, but no right of action); Race v. Hay, 28 F.R.D. 354, 357 (N.D. Ind.
1961) (under Illinois workers' compensation statute, insurer is not a real party in interest if the
employee has brought suit).
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pensating insurer. Thus, in Chaplin v. Bruce 166 the district court concluded that
a workers' compensation carrier was a real party in interest under rule 17(a)
after finding "direct statutory authority for ...a substantive right under state
law for a workmen's compensation insurer to proceed against and recover its
167
interest in its insured's claim against the tortfeasor."'

If there were no rule 17(a), there would be more decisions like Strate and
Chaplin, which look to the insurer's entitlement under the substantive law to
assert the claim. There would be fewer cases like Wright, Poleski, and Baltimore

Transit, which look only to the insurer's reimbursement or lien interest. Without a rule 17(a), the issue would arise, most likely, as a rule 12(b)(6) motion for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 168 directed toward the

insured's assertion of a claim to which an insurer is subrogated. In such a posture, a court would be guided more clearly toward the question of whether the
insured or the insurer is entitled under the substantive law to sue the third party.
A court would be less likely to become distracted by entitlements and pecuniary
interests that fall short of the right to sue. The distinctions in state subrogation
law that ought to be preserved under rule 17(a) would be honored more consistently and correctly if there were no such rule. 169
3.

Insureds as Real Parties in Interest

The same analytical problems that appear when courts address whether a

compensating insurer is a real party in interest under rule 17(a) arise when the
question is whether a partially compensated insured is a real party in interest.
This latter question arises because of the argument, generally asserted to avoid

joinder of the insurer, that the insured is entitled to assert in his own name the
entire original claim, regardless of the insurer's subrogation interest in the claim.
0
For example, in BraniffAirways, Inc. v. Falkingham 17
the insured brought
suit for his entire loss, and the defendant moved for an order requiring joinder of
the plaintiff's partially subrogated insurers on the grounds that they were real

parties in interest and were, therefore, "necessary" parties. 17 1 To determine the
166. 57 F.R.D. 487 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
167. Id. at 488. The court considered both Oklahoma and Louisiana statutes, either of which
arguably might have controlled. The Louisiana statute quoted by the court provided, "Any employer having paid or having become obligated to pay compensation under the provisions of this
Chapter may bring suit against such third person to recover any amount which he has paid or
become obligated to pay .. " Id. at 488 n.2.; see also Lucas v. Durabond Prod. Co., 510 F. Supp.
999, 1000-01 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (workers' compensation carrier is a real party in interest because
carrier is entitled under Pennsylvania law to maintain an action against the wrongdoer); Cross v.
Harrington, 294 F. Supp. 1340, 1341 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (same under Mississippi workers' compensation); Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp. 692, 694 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (same under
Michigan workers' compensation). See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 9, §§ 74.12-74.13, 74.15
(identifying workers' compensation statutes that entitle subrogee to bring suit against the tortfeasor).
168. Because the motion might include material outside the pleadings presented to show the
insurer's involvement, it may appear in the form of a motion for summary judgment. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) & 56; see also supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text (discussing various formats for
objecting to the party named as plaintiff).
169. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; infra note 196 and accompanying text.
170. 20 F.R.D. 141 (D. Minn. 1957).
171. Id. at 142; see infra note 272.
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insurers' rights, the federal court first examined the applicable Minnesota substantive law and the parties' contract of insurance. The court concluded that
"[s]ince by the state substantive law [the insurers] have an enforceable right,
they are real parties in interest for the purposes of an action in the federal court
if it is their wish to pursue it.' 172 Turning to the question of compulsory joinder, however, the court held that the insurers' joinder was not required, based on
its assumption that in spite of the insurers' interests, the insured was entitled to
bring an action for the entire claim, including that portion to which the insurers
were subrogated. The court reasoned that joinder was unnecessary to avoid
multiple litigation because the entire claim would be resolved in this lawsuit.173
Although the court examined the substantive law to determine the insurers'
rights, it did not do so to establish the insured's.1 74 Apparently, the court
merely assumed that because the insured had been compensated only partially,
the insured remained "the party in legal interest" for the entire claim. 175 Because of the variations in substantive law from state to state with regard to the
rights of a partially compensated insured, 176 however, the assumption was unwarranted. It was, nonetheless, an assumption that the court used to avoid join1 77
der of the insurers.
Somewhat more recently, in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.178 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also
found that although an insurer was subrogated, a suit for the entire claim could
proceed in the name of the insured alone. The plaintiff, Virginia Electric &
Power Company (VEPCO), allegedly had suffered $2,200,000 in damages from
the failure of a power generating station. All but $150,000 of the loss had been
reimbursed by VEPCO's insurer, Insurance Company of North America
(INA). 179 VEPCO and INA had agreed that INA would be subrogated to
VEPCO's claim against others allegedly responsible for the loss and that INA
would furnish counsel and have "exclusive direction and control" of the claim.
INA and its counsel also agreed to prosecute VEPCO's uninsured $150,000 loss,
but agreed that VEPCO would not be obligated for the costs and expenses of the
suit. 180

The parties brought suit in federal district court in VEPCO's name alone
for the entire $2,200,000 loss. 18' The defendants moved to dismiss the action on
the grounds that INA was the real party in interest under federal rule 17(a) and
172. Braniff,20 F.R.D. at 143.
173. Id. at 144.
174. The court did note that a Minnesota rule that the insured can sue alone without joinder was
procedural and, therefore, inapplicable. id. at 143.
175. Id. at 143-44.
176. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
177. Braniff, 20 F.R.D. at 144-45. But see supra note 105 and accompanying text (when both
insured and insurer have the right to sue, joinder generally required).
178. 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
179. Id. at 81-82.
180. Id. at 81-82 nn.1 & 2.
181. At the time the suit was brought, VEPCO may have been in control of the action. Thereafter, however, as part of the settlement of a dispute between VEPCO and INA about the amount of
coverage, VEPCO relinquished control to INA. Id. at 82.
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that, because both INA and one defendant were citizens of Pennsylvania, the
82
court lacked jurisdiction. 1
Remarkably, the court did find that VEPCO was, under rule 17(a), a real
party in interest entitled to enforce the whole claim. The court first distinguished the present case from that of full subrogation by noting that VEPCO
retained "a significant pecuniary interest in the litigation."' 18 3 But of course, as
84
we have seen, a pecuniary interest does not a real party in interest make,'
especially to the extent of someone else's pecuniary interest over which the putative real party in interest has no control. The court nevertheless stated that
VEPCO was "entitled under the substantive law to bring suit for its entire
loss."185
The Virginia Electric court's finding that under Virginia "substantive" law
the insured was a real party in interest entitled to enforce the entire claim was
based upon a misreading of a Virginia Supreme Court decision, Miller v. Tomlinson.18 6 Miller was concerned only with the joinder question and did not address the rights of the insured and the insurer to bring the claim or to benefit
from the recovery. The Virginia court held that, in light of the danger of jury
prejudice, the trial court had erred in requiring joinder of the plaintiff's subrogated insurer. 1 87 It would seem more accurate, therefore, to characterize Miller
as approving the procedural device of suit in the name of the insured, rather
than as establishing an insured's substantive right in not only its own portion,
but also in the subrogated portion of the claim. Miller does not stand for the
proposition that the insured is entitled to pursue and control the insurer's claim
regardless of the insurer's wishes. Furthermore, the substantive rights of the
insured and insurer to assert the claim would not be affected if Virginia decided
to reverse its position and require joinder of subrogated insurers when suit is
88
brought for the entire claim.1
Even if one accepts the premise that the Miller case gives the insured such a
substantive right, the insured in Virginia Electric arguably had relinquished this
182. Id. at 81. Alternatively, the defendants argued that INA was a party who must be joined
under rule 19(a) and that, because INA could not be joined, the suit must be dismissed under rule
19(b). Id. The court concluded that although INA was "a party to be joined if feasible" under rule
19(a), the suit could proceed without joinder pursuant to rule 19(b). Id. at 85-86.
183. Id. at 83.
184. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
185. Virginia Elec., 485 F.2d at 83.
186. 194 Va. 367, 73 S.E.2d 378 (1952).
187. Id. at 373, 73 S.E.2d at 382. The Miller court noted a Virginia statute permitting a subrogated insurer to enforce its claim against the third party, but asserted that this statute was for the
plaintiff's benefit and did not require joinder at a defendant's request. Id. at 372, 73 S.E.2d at 38182. The Virginia statute now provides specifically that a subrogated insurer may enforce its claim in
either its own name or in the name of its insured. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-207 (1986); see Travelers

Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 813-14 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding the Virginia statute procedural and,
therefore, not determinative of the joinder issue).
188. This statement is borne out in part by the later decision in Riggs, in which the court held,
applying federal procedure under rules 17(a) and 19 and Virginia substantive law, that a partially
subrogated insurer is entitled to joinder of its insured as a co-plaintiff, but not to bring the claim in
the name of the insured alone. Riggs, 671 F.2d at 814.
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189
right when it gave the insurer "exclusive direction and control" of the suit.
Thus, the court in effect authorized "use" practice in the name of the very rule
that was intended to abolish this device. 190 As in the courts of law before the
time of the "real party in interest" rule, the Virginia Electric court permitted
prosecution of the suit in the name of a party who had no right to control the
action, while the person holding the right to control remained unnamed. 19' The
insured was neither interested in the subrogated portion of the claim nor in control of the suit. Regarding the portion of the claim in which the insured did
have a pecuniary interest, the insured actually was merely a person being represented, entitled to benefit from another's conduct of the litigation. In light of the
parties' agreement, the court of appeals in Virginia Electric should have held
that INA was the only "real party in interest" under rule 17(a). 192 Nevertheless, the court concluded that "[w]here there is partial subrogation, there are two
real parties in interest under Rule 17. Either party may bring suit-the insurersubrogee to the extent it has reimbursed the subrogor, or the subrogor for either
the entire loss or only its unreimbursed loss."193
Were there no rule 17(a), the Braniffand Virginia Electric courts might not
have been distracted by rubrics about partial subrogation and "real parties in
interest." The defendants' objections in Braniffand Virginia Electricmight have
appeared as rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted directed to the insured's right to assert, in spite of
the insurer's interest, his entire original claim. In both cases, the courts, freed
from rule 17(a)'s baggage, might have found that the insured was not entitled by
the substantive law to assert and control the entire claim. In Braniff such a
finding would have led to joinder of the insurer under rule 19,194 while in Virginia Electric the finding would have required joinder or substitution of INA,
followed by dismissal for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.195 Rule
17(a) should not be permitted to undermine policies of compulsory joinder and
federal jurisdiction. Its abolition would eliminate its potential to do so.
189. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.

190. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
192. Another alternative, in light of VEPCO's role in the suit at the time it was filed, see supra
note 181, might have been for the court to invoke its discretion under federal rule 25(c) to permit the
suit to continue as styled. Rule 25, Substitution of Parties, provides that "[i]n case of any transfer of
interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion
directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party." FED. R. Civ. P. 25(c). The correctness of this approach, however, would seem
to depend upon whether INA was a party whose joinder was required even before the execution of
the subrogation agreement.

193. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir. 1973)
(citing United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1949)), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 935 (1974); see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
194. See supranotes 170-77 and accompanying text. But see supra note 17 (discussing disagreement among federal courts about whether rule 19 requires joinder of partially subrogated insurers).
195. See infra notes 364-88 and accompanying text.
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DistinguishingState Substancefrom State Procedure
It is universally acknowledged that under federal rule 17(a), state law deter-

196
mines a person's substantive right to assert a claim that arises under state law,

but that federal procedure controls the naming of parties and joinder.1 97 An
equally acknowledged corollary is that state rules of procedure are irrelevant
under federal rule 17(a). 198 The problem arises when federal courts fail to distinguish correctly between substance and procedure under state law.
The difficulty is created in part by the many state procedural provisions
permitting suit in the name of the insured alone regardless of an insurer's inter-

est. 199 The problem generally is not that federal courts construe these provisions as substantive. Rather, the problem is that because of these provisions, it

may be difficult to find state law decisions addressing the substantive rights of
the insured and insurer to sue a third party. Insurers permitted to sue in the
name of their insureds will do so; thus, there may be no decisions analyzing
2° °
whether an insurer may enforce its claim directly against the third party.
Similarly, unless some conflict between insured and insurer has been litigated,
there might be no decisions discussing whether the insured may enforce the entire claim.

20

'

Wattles v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,202 a case concerning a claim for property
damage brought in the name of the insured alone, illustrates the difficulty that
196. See, eg., American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All Amer. Bus Lines, Inc., 179 F.2d 7, 10
(10th Cir. 1949); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 143 (D. Minn. 1957); 3A
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, 17.07, at 17-49. State law also may be applied when
the court is merely enforcing a federal remedy for a traditional state-created right. J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 31, at 321.
197. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 453; Clark & Moore, supra note 55, at 1310.
198. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 813-14 (4th Cir. 1982); Gas Serv. Co. v. Hunt,
183 F.2d 417, 419-20 (10th Cir. 1950); 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42,
§ 1544, at 342-43.
199. See supra note 111.
200. One unusual case is United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 278 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1979), in which
the partially compensating insurer, entitled under state law to bring suit in the name of the insured,
brought suit in its own name, apparently because the insured was barred from suing by spousal
immunity. The court held that the insurer was not a real party in interest entitled to maintain the
action because the rule in Iowa was that
the right of action remains in the insured for the entire loss, the insured becoming a trustee
for the insurer (to the extent of the loss paid by the insurer) in the recovery secured by it;
that the right of action for the entire loss is single and cannot be split and separately maintained by the owner and the various insurers who have paid parts of the loss.
Id. at 31 (quoting Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Bremmer, 25 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1928)).
201. In White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1204
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d Cir. 1978) and aff'd mem. sub nom. Quaglia v.
Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978), the court, attempting to identify
the proper plaintiff under rule 17(a) when a loan receipt had been used, observed:
Not surprisingly, this Court's research reveals no Pennsylvania case on point. Under the
terms of the loan receipt method of transaction, the insured rather than the insurer initiates
any court action brought against a third party and thus neither Pennsylvania's nor other
courts would likely encounter the issue of whether the insurer itself could bring the action.
It thus becomes necessary to attempt to ascertain what Pennsylvania's courts would do if
such issue were in fact raised.
Id. at 1204. For a discussion of loan receipts, see infra notes 211-61 and accompanying text.
202. 82 F.R.D. 446 (D. Neb. 1979).
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federal courts have had in ascertaining state law with regard to substantive subrogation rights. In Wattles the court concluded that a partially compensating
insurer was a real party in interest and ordered its joinder, after rejecting as
procedural Nebraska decisions holding that suit might be brought in the name of
the insured for the entire loss. 2 0 3 The court then cited three Nebraska cases for
the proposition that "it is clear that the insurer as subrogee by virtue of its payment of the loss sustained by the insured, has a substantive right to recover from
2°4
the wrongdoer the amount it has been obliged to pay under its policy."
The Nebraska cases cited by the Wattles court for this point, however,, do
not establish that under Nebraska law a partially compensating insurer is entitled to bring and control an action against a third party. One case did not even
involve a partially compensating insurer, but held only that the insurer is the
sole real party in interest when the insured has been fully compensated. 20 5
Neither of the other two cases, which did involve partially compensating insurers, called upon the courts to determine the insurers' right to bring suit. In one
case the issue was whether the insured was entitled to sue, 20 6 and in the other
the issue was whether the insured's attorney, who had settled the entire claim
20 7
against the third party, was entitled to an attorney's fee from the insurer.

Moreover, to the extent that the latter two cases did discuss the issue, they seem
to indicate that the insurer is not entitled to bring and control the action. 20 8
As long as states permit parties to assert subrogated claims in the name of
the insured alone regardless of actual control (as may have been the situation in
203. Id. at 449-51. The plaintiff in Wattles argued that the court should follow Schweitz v.
Robatham, 194 Neb. 668, 670, 234 N.W.2d 834, 836 (1975), which stated that in the case of partial
subrogation, the action may be brought in the name of the insured for the entire loss, and Krause v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 593, 169 N.W.2d 601, 604 (1969), which stated that
the insured is a trustee for the benefit of the insurer. The Wattles court responded that the plaintiff's
argument failed to consider the distinction between substance and procedure. Wattles, 82 F.R.D. at
449. The court, apparently concluding that the cases cited by the plaintiff concerned only the naming of parties, insisted that this matter is procedural and therefore a question of federal, not state,
law. Id. at 450.
204. Wattles, 82 F.R.D. at 449-50. The court's statement about what is "clear" brings to mind
Gegan's law and its corollary: "Gegan's Law: The tendency for any conclusion to be called clear is
in inverse ratio to the reasons available to support it. Corollary: Clarity tends to obscure and absolute clarity obscures absolutely." Gegan, Constructive Trusts: 4 New Basisfor Tracing Equities, 53
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 593, 602 n.34 (1979).
205. Jelinek v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 196 Neb. 488, 490, 243 N.W.2d 778, 779 (1976).
206, Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska Nat'1 Hotel Co., 143 Neb. 404, 407-09, 9 N.W.2d 807,
811-12 (1943).
207. Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 590-91, 169 N.W.2d 601, 603-04
(1969).
208. The Shiman court stated that in a partial compensation situation, "the right of action
against the wrong doer who caused the loss remains in the insured for the entire loss, and the action
must be brought by him in his own name." Shiman, 143 Neb. at 409, 9 N.W.2d at 811 (emphasis
added). The Krause court stated that the insured is a trustee for the insurer with regard to recoveries
from third parties and that this approach "preserves the unity and control of the insured over his
cause of action for personal injury and property damage against the tort-feasor, and yet fully protects
the insurer's subrogation right." Krause, 184 Neb. at 593, 169 N.W.2d at 604 (emphasis added).
The Wattles court, therefore, may have been much too quick in concluding that the statements in
Nebraska decisions cited by the plaintiff were setting forth merely procedural rules. See supra note
196. There is irony in the Wattles court's criticism of the plaintiff's argument because of its "failure
to consider the subtle, yet important, substantive-procedural distinction," Wattles, 82 F.R.D. at 449,
followed by the court's own failure to carefully apply this distinction.
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Nebraska at the time of Wattles20 9), insurers will do so, and federal courts will
continue to have difficulty (as the Wattles court apparently had) locating state
210
court decisions directly addressing the parties' substantive rights in the claim.

The task, nonetheless, is unavoidable. If there were no rule 17(a), federal courts
would still have to ascertain whether the named plaintiff is entitled under the
substantive law to assert the claim. Analytical clarity in cases such as Wattles,
however, might be facilitated if the question were presented as a party's entitle-

ment to assert the claim, and not whether the party is a "real party in interest."
C. Loan Receipts

In the Fifth Circuit during the 1950s, insurers successfully used the device
of a loan receipt to avoid real party in interest status. 2 11 In a loan receipt device,

the casualty insurer "lends" its insured an amount of money commensurate with
the insured's claim against his insurance coverage. The insured promises to repay the loan only if, and to the extent that, the insured recovers from third
parties for the loss. 2 12 At least in those jurisdictions in which the loan receipt is

given its desired effect, the transfer of money is considered to be a loan, not a
payment. Accordingly, the insurance company is not subrogated to the in-

sured's claim against third parties, is not characterized as a real party in interest
in spite of its control of the lawsuit, and is able to recoup from the tortfeasor
2 13
througl4 a suit brought in the name of the insured alone.

In Celanese Corp. ofAmerica v. John Clark Industries,Inc.21 4 the defendant
challenged a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the grounds, inter alia, that the

plaintiff's insurers were indispensable parties, or at least real parties in interest,
and that the defendant should have had the benefit of making known to the jury
the interests of the insurers. 2 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments, stating that the suit "was properly
2 16
prosecuted by plaintiff under loan receipts."

209. See supra notes 203 & 208.
210. See supra note 201. This difficulty was encountered in Virginia Elee. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974), in which the
court, relying upon a Virginia Supreme Court decision that permitted suit in the name of the insured
alone, found that an insured was a "real party in interest" with regard to a claim that was predominantly subrogated and completely controlled by the insurer. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. The same difficulty in distinguishing state law substance from procedure for rule 17(a)
purposes is found in cases involving loan receipts, see infra notes 211-61 and accompanying text, and
cases involving rule 17(a)'s "exceptions" clause, see infra notes 320-33 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
212. R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 93, § 3.10(c), at 241-42.
213. See Annotation, Insurance: Validity and Effect of Loan Receipt or Agreement Between Insuredand Insurerfor a Loan Repayable to Extent of Insured's Recoveryfrom Another, 13 A.L.R.3D
42 (1967 & Supp. 1989). Loan receipts used by first-party insurers to avoid subrogee status must be
distinguished from loan receipts used by defendants and their liability insurers for the purpose of
colluding with the plaintiff to the detriment of a codefendant. The latter type of loan receipt is often
termed a "Mary Carter agreement." See Entman, Mary CarterAgreements: An Assessment ofAttempted Solutions, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 521, 522-23 (1986).
214. 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954).
215. Id. at 553.
216. Id. at 556.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

In support of the loan receipt device, Judge Hutcheson of the Celanese
court cited both Texas and federal decisions, 217 including the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Luckenbach v. WJ. McCahan Sugar Refining
Co.,218 a federal admiralty case. Without discussing the appropriate source of
law-state or federal-for determining the legal effect of the loan agreement,
Judge Hutcheson suggested that in a loan receipt case the insured is the only2real
19
party in interest and the insurance companies are not even proper parties.
Discussing rule 17(a), Judge Hutcheson stated in Celanese that the purpose
of the real party in interest rule is to enable a defendant to assert available defenses against the real party in interest and to protect the defendant from multiple litigation on the same matter.2 20 None of these concerns, according to the
court, was a legitimate problem for the defendant in this case because it "was
understood by all that the counsel for the insurance companies were in active
conduct of the suit and the judgment entered would have barred them whether
or not they were actually in the cause. ' 22 1 The defendant's only purpose in
seeking joinder of the insurers was a desire to benefit improperly from possible
222
jury prejudice against an insurance company plaintiff.
Five years later, in Peoples Loan & Finance Corp. v. Lawson,223 Judge
Hutcheson, again writing for the Fifth Circuit, specifically distinguished Aetna
224
on the basis of the insurer's use of a loan receipt in compensating the insured.
The court cited a Georgia appellate court decision, 225 but relied primarily upon
Luckenbach, which the court interpreted as settling that compensation through
a loan receipt is not a payment giving rise to subrogation 226 and,
therefore, the
227
insurance company in a loan receipt case need not be joined.
Judge Cameron, dissenting from Judge Hutcheson's opinion in the Lawson
case, distinguished Luckenbach,228 and ignored altogether the role of state law.
Cameron argued that Luckenbach did not support a finding that the loan receipt
217. Id. at 556 n.9. For a discussion of the Texas decisions cited in Celanese, see infra text
accompanying notes 233-37.

218. 248 U.S. 139 (1918). The Supreme Court determined the effect of the loan receipt agreement in Luckenbach according to the "general law of insurance," id. at 148-49, that is, under federal
common law, and not under the law of any state. See infra note 237.
219. Celanese, 214 F.2d at 556.
220. Id. Professor Wright cites Celanese as the first enunciation that rule 17(a) has these purposes. C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 453 n.6.
221. Celanese, 214 F.2d at 556.
222. Id. at 556-57. In response to the Celanese court's criticism of the defendant's purpose in

seeking joinder of the insurer, a later court argued that insurers resisting joinder "are tarred by the
same brush; their motive in seeking anonymity is improper and perhaps illegal." City Stores Co. v.

Lerner Shops of D.C., Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1013 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See infra note 261 for a
dissenting view in City Stores.
223. 271 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
224. Id. at 532.

225. Id. (citing Green v. Johns, 86 Ga. App. 646, 72 S.E.2d 78 (1952) (discussed hfra notes 24850 and accompanying text)).
226. Lawson, 271 F.2d at 532. Once again, Judge Hutcheson relied upon Luckenbach without
discussing whether the insurer's subrogation rights were a matter of state or federal law. See supra
notes 218-19 and accompanying text; infra note 237.
227. Lawson, 271 F.2d at 532.
228. Id. at 533-37 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
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was a valid loan in the context of an insurance obligation that, unlike the one in
Luckenbach,229 required immediate payment and was not contingent. 230 He

contended that in this context, the court should treat the loan receipt as an
unconditional payment, with the result that the insurance company is subro23 1
gated to the insured's claim.

The Fifth Circuit's approach to the real party in interest status of an insurer
that has paid compensation through a loan receipt suffers from several analytical
defects. First, like the courts that erroneously have focused upon pecuniary interest in determining the real party in interest, 232 Judge Hutcheson failed to

appreciate that the real party in interest is simply the party entitled to control
the action. In Celanese and Lawson, the courts ignored the purposes and meaning of the real party in interest rule and permitted suit to proceed in the name of

a party who, through the loan receipt itself, had relinquished control of the
claim. Moreover, the Celanese court treated rule 17(a) as a rule designed to

avoid multiple litigation, and thus added a new element of confusion in rule
17(a) jurisprudence. 2 33 Further, as shown by the Fifth Circuit's reliance upon
Luckenbach, the court failed to appreciate that the substantive law from which
the rights of the parties arise is the proper source for determining whether the
insured or the insurer is entitled to control the action and is, therefore, the real
party in interest. Because the Supreme Court in Luckenbach determined the

rights of the plaintiff shipper and its insurer under the loan receipt as a matter of
federal common law,2 34 that case should not have been treated as controlling
precedent in Celanese or Lawson, in which the parties' rights derived from state

law. Rather, the Fifth Circuit should have looked to the applicable state law to
determine whether a loan receipt agreement would have left the insured with a

right to enforce the claim.
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, other federal courts have recognized that
the effect of a loan receipt on the insurer's status as a real party in interest is a
229. Judge Cameron pointed out that in Luckenbach the plaintiff insured was a shipper of goods
and the defendants were the carriers. The insurers had insured the goods for the shipper, but their
liability for loss of the goods was contingent upon a finding of nonliability of the carriers to the
insured. In this context, the purpose of the loan receipt was to lend the money to the shipper during
the period that the liability of the carriers was being litigated and, in exchange for the loan, to give
the insurer control of the litigation against the carriers and the right to payment by the insured of
amounts recovered from the carriers. The defendant carriers in Luckenbach contended that the
transaction was payment by the insurers, not a loan, and that the shipper, therefore, had been paid in
full and should not be permitted to maintain the action. The Supreme Court found in Luckenbach
that the loan receipt was a valid loan and that the shipper was entitled to bring the action in his own

name. Lawson, 271 F.2d at 534 (Cameron, J., dissenting) (citing Luckenbach, 248 U.S. at 148-49).

230. Lawson, 271 F.2d at 535 (Cameron, J., dissenting). Judge Cameron, like Judge Hutcheson,
apparently was unaware that the effect of the loan receipt, with regard to the insurer's substantive
rights and its status as a "real party in interest," was properly a matter of state law, so that the
Luckenbach decision, regardless of its holding, should not have been controlling. See infra note 237.
231. For cases so holding, see supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text. Judge Cameron also
noted that the action had been initiated by the attorneys for the insurer, albeit in the name of the
insured. Lawson, 271 F.2d at 535 (Cameron, J. dissenting).
232. See supra notes 141-95 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. For further discussion of rule 17(a) and
avoidance of multiple litigation see supra note 16; infra notes 262-319 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 218; infra note 237.
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matter of the law from which the insurer's rights arise. 235 That is, if under the
applicable substantive law, the use of a loan receipt means that the insurer does
not have a right to sue, a court should not consider the insurer a real party in
interest for purposes of federal rule 17(a). On the other hand, if under the governing law an insurer is subrogated in spite of its use of a loan receipt, the insurer should be considered a real party in interest.
The latter point is well illustrated in Rosenfeld v. ContinentalBuilding Operating Co.,236 in which a Missouri federal district court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the United States Supreme Court's federal common law decision
in Luckenbach was controlling precedent with regard to the effect of the loan

receipt payment in the case before the court. 23 7 Rather, the Rosenfeld court
concluded that, under Missouri choice-of-law principles, the effect of the loan
receipt should be determined by the substantive law of New York, where the

loan receipt and payments were made. 238 The Rosenfeld court then applied a
New York Court of Appeals decision holding that a loan receipt is payment
unless the insurance policy contains a provision authorizing the insurer to discharge its liabilities by a loan. 239 Because there was no provision in the policy
authorizing the insurer to settle its liabilities by a loan, the court held that the
loan in the amount of the plaintiff's entire loss was a payment, and that the
insurer was the real party in interest. 24° Therefore, the court sustained the de-

235. See, eg., White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F. Supp.
1202, 1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (under Pennsylvania law, insurer who has paid by way of a loan
receipt is not entitled to the benefits of outright payment, such as the right to bring suit as a subrogee
and, therefore, is not a real party in interest under federal rule 17(a)), aff'd mene., 578 F.2d 1377 (3d
Cir. 1978) and aff'd mem. sub nom. Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 578 F.2d 1375
(3d Cir. 1978); 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, 117.09[2.-4], at 17-89 n.5 (collecting cases); Annotation, supra note 213, at 115-16.
236. 135 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Mo. 1955). The author of the Rosenfeld opinion was District
Judge Charles E. Whittaker, who served on the United States Supreme Court from 1957 to 1962.
237. Id. at 469 (discussing Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918)).
Judge Whittaker explained that the plaintiff's reliance upon Luckenbach was mistaken because
Luckenbach
was decided by Justice Brandeis ... at a time when it was thought there was Federal
common law, but Justice Brandeis himself wiped out the authority of that case, and many
others, by overruling Swift v. Tyson in his opinion in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
.. [1938], holding that there is no Federal common law, and that, upon a non-Federal
question, the controlling substantive law is the law of the state.
Id. Judge Whittaker overstated his case. The Court in Erie stated, "There is no federal general
common law." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). Federal common law continues to operate, of
course, in areas that are not properly matters of state law, and the Luckenbach case continues to be
perfectly good federal common law on the effect of loan receipts in cases in which the rule of decision
is properly federal. See generallyFriendly, In Praise ofErie-And ofthe New FederalCommon Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405-22 (1964) (discussing the role of federal common law after Erie).
238. Rosenfeld, 135 F. Supp. at 468-69.
239. Id. at 469. The court noted that development in the loan receipt area was arrested in New
York when the legislature amended the real party in interest statute to provide that "'an insured
person... which has executed to his insurer either a loan or subrogation receipt, trust agreement, or
other similar instrument ....
may sue without joining with him the person for whose benefit the
action is prosecuted.' " Id. (citing New York Civil Practice Act § 210). Because this statute was
"purely adjective and procedural," it did not affect the outcome under federal rule 17(a), however,
and the court relied upon substantive New York law regarding subrogation rights resulting from a
loan receipt payment. Id.
240. Id. at 470.
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fendant's rule 17(a) objection to prosecution of the action in the name of the

insured.

24 1

In both the Celanese and Lawson decisions, the court did cite state law
cases as well as Luckenbach, but the decisions cited did not support the proposi-

tion that the insurer was not a real party in interest under federal rule 17(a). In
fact, the courts' reliance upon these state cases illustrates the problem of failing
to distinguish between a procedural and a substantive decision under state
law.

242

Neither of the Texas cases cited in Celanese,Hudson UnderwritersAgency v.
Ablon 24 3 and Houston TransitCo. v. Goldston,244 established that an insurer that
has paid by loan receipt is not entitled to enforce its reimbursement interest
against third parties. Quite to the contrary, in Hudson, the insurer had compensated the insured fully and was in complete control of the suit brought in the
insured's name. 245 The two Texas cases cited by the Celanese court stand only
for the proposition that under Texas law a compensating insurer who has paid
by loan receipt, and possibly any compensating insurer, 246 is entitled to sue in
the name of the insured. 247 Thus, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's interpretation,
the cases actually support treating an insurer as a real party in interest under the

federal rule because they show that the insurer has enforcement rights under
Texas law.
Similarly, in Lawson, the court cited Green v. Johns,248 a Georgia case holding that the insured may be the sole named plaintiff when the insurer has used a
loan receipt, even though the insurer had the right under the terms of the loan
241. Id. The action was dismissed "but with leave to the insurer to come into the case as the
plaintiff,... and to prosecute it in its own name." Id.
The converse of this situation was presented in Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 99
F.R.D. 58 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd in part, 795 F.2d 87 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court, citing
Rosenfeld, held that the insurer who had compensated the plaintiff through a loan receipt was not a
real party in interest for purposes of federal rule 17(a). Id. at 60. The court noted the importance of
following state substantive, not procedural, law and declined to give any effect to Alabama Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a), which required joinder of an insurer that has become subrogated through a
loan receipt. Id. at 59-60. The court found that its decision was controlled by an Alabama decision,
predating the procedural rule, holding that an insurer who otherwise has no subrogation rights does
not acquire such rights through a loan receipt payment to its insured. Id. (citing McKenzie v. North
River Ins. Co., 257 Ala. 265, 58 So. 2d 581 (1951)). Unfortunately, the Industrial Development
Board court failed to consider whether the insurer in the case before the court did have, under
Alabama substantive law, subrogation rights outside of the loan receipt agreement. If so, then the
insurer would have been a real party in interest for purposes of rule 17(a)-not because of the Alabama procedural rule, but simply because of Alabama substantive law. See City of Birmingham v.
Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154-55, 101 So. 2d 250, 252-53 (1958) (discussing subrogation right of property insurer).
242. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
243. 203 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
244. 217 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
245. Hudson, 203 S.W.2d at 585.
246. In Houston Transit Co. the court stated, "We by no means hold that in the absence of a
'loan receipt' transaction, the appellant [defendant] would have been entitled to treat the insurance
company here as the real party at interest .... " 217 S.W.2d at 438.
247. Id.; Hudson, 203 S.W.2d at 585.
248. 86 Ga. App. 646, 72 S.E.2d 78 (1952), cited in Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Lawson, 271
F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
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receipt to exclusive control of the lawsuit.249 To the extent that the Lawson

court was relying upon state law to determine the effect of a loan receipt, therefore, it failed to distinguish between state procedural joinder decisions and state
law with regard to the right of the insurer to bring suit to enforce its subrogation
interest. 250 Some federal courts, however, have appreciated this distinction and
have declined to follow state law regarding loan receipts when the state rule
25 1
merely permits an insurer to bring suit in the insured's name.

Once again, a complicating factor for federal courts attempting to ascertain

the effect of a loan receipt on the insurer's right to sue is that many states permit
suit in the name of the insured alone regardless of an insurer's subrogation
rights. 2 52 In these jurisdictions, there is no point in defendants attacking loan
receipts, if they are used at all, because courts will not require joinder of the
subrogated insurer in any case. Consequently, state court decisions about the

2 53
effect of a loan receipt on an insurer's right to bring suit are unlikely to exist.
Even when the effect of a loan receipt is properly a question of federal law,
not all federal courts have agreed with the Fifth Circuit's approval of the device. 254 In City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops of District of Columbia, Inc.2ss the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit required
joinder of a plaintiff's insurer that had settled its liability to the plaintiff through
a loan receipt. 256 The court distinguished Luckenbach, as had Judge Cameron
in Lawson, on the ground that the insurer's liability in Luckenbach was only
contingent. 257 The court found that in an ordinary property damage case in
which the insurer's liability is absolute, the use of a loan receipt results from "an
249. Green, 86 Ga. App. at 652, 72 S.E.2d at 82; see also Childers v. Eastern Foam Prod., Inc.,
94 F.R.D. 53, 55-56 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (like Lawson, followed Georgia law approving of loan receipts
as a device to avoid joinder of the insurer that nonetheless controls the litigation to the extent of its
interest).
250. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 185 F. Supp. 197, 200-01 (D. Mont.
1960), aff'd, 300 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1962); Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F.

Supp. 465, 469 (W.D. Mo. 1955) (discussed supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text); see also
Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 58, 60 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (declining to follow
Alabama procedural rule requiring joinder of insurer; discussed supra note 241).
252. See supra note 111.
253. See supra note 201. In Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 54 F.R.D. 486,
489 (D. Md. 1972), the court did not refer to state subrogation law, but noted that the loan receipt
provided that the insurer "would pay for and have 'exclusive direction and control' of any suit such
as the present one to recover for the loss." The court then stated,
A payment conditioned on such control by an insurance company ... hardly amounts to a
bona fide loan so as to avoid the requirements of Rules 17 and 19. Under an agreement
between an insured and its insurer such as the one here present, this Court concludes that
the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent that it has paid portions
of the loss in question.
Id.
254. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1974).
255. 410 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
256. Id. at 1015.
257. Id. at 1013. The court did not address the issue of what jurisdiction's substantive law
controlled the rights of the insurer and the effect of the loan receipt agreement. The court referred to
the case as one of first impression, id. at 1014, apparently assuming that federal common law controlled because the plaintiff's property damage claim arose from a fire in the District of Columbia.
Id. at 1011.
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unworthy motive, if not an improper and illegal purpose," 25 8 and is "a transparent subterfuge to avoid subrogation and to evade" rule 17(a).259
The City Stores court fully appreciated the meaning of the real party in
interest rule, keeping the focus of its analysis on the question of who controlled
the claim. The court stated that by executing a loan receipt, "the insured simply
sells to the insurance company the right to use his name as party plaintiff in a

suit brought against a third party which is to be exclusively directed and con-

trolled by the insurer at its expense and for its benefit."'2 60 The court held that
in spite of an insurer's use of a loan receipt, the insurer "is subrogated to the
rights of the insured and so is the real party in interest in a suit against a third
26 1
party."
Rule 17(a) has done nothing to solve the loan receipt problem. Once again,
if federal courts asked whether the insured or insurer was entitled, in light of the
loan receipt agreement, to state a claim for relief regarding the loss alleged in the
complaint, they at least would be pointed in the right direction. In examining
state loan receipt precedents, courts might consider more carefully whether the
state decisions mean that the insurer using such an agreement is, in fact, not
subrogated, or whether the decisions mean only that the insurer is entitled to
assert the claim in the name of its insured.
V.
4.

RULE 17(A) AND COMPULSORY JOINDER

Rule 17(a) as a Rule Requiring Joinder

A particularly troubling aspect of rule 17(a) jurisprudence has been a judicial tendency to extend the rule beyond its borders to become a rule of compulsory joinder. A recent manifestation of this tendency is a 1985 federal district
court decision, Carpetland, U.S.A. v. JL. Adler Roofing, Inc.,262 in which the
court held that rule 17(a) is "an independent authority for compulsory joinder"
separate from rule 19.263 The rule's expansion into compulsory joinder was accepted, albeit reluctantly, by Judge Craven of the Fourth Circuit in Virginia
258. Id. at 1013.
259. Id. at 1015.
260. Id.
261. Id. Relying upon Aetna for the proposition that if the insurers are subrogated, they should
be joined, id. at 1012, the court ordered "that the insurance companies be made parties plaintiff, as
the real parties in interest." Id. at 1015. Judge Burger dissented, arguing that there is "nothing
'unworthy,' 'illegal,' or even undesirable in seeking to have the triers evaluate the case without regard to liability coverage." Id. at 1015-16 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Judge Burger's dissent was relied upon by the court in Acro Automation Sys., Inc. v. Iscont
Shipping Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 413, 421 (D. Md. 1989), in which the court condoned use of a loan

receipt agreement to avoid joinder of the insurer as a party plaintiff. Pursuant to the loan receipt
agreement, the plaintiffs had received from their insurer all but $500 of their $252,110 loss and the
insurer was in complete control of the litigation. Id. at 419. The court reasoned that as the insurer,

because of its actual control, would be bound by the litigation, id. at 420, "the agreement, intended
to circumvent the requirements of Rule 17(a), [did not] frustrate the policies of the rule." Id. at 422.
The court relied upon Celanese for the proposition that the policy of the rule was the avoidance of
multiple litigation. Id. at 420-21.
262. 107 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
263. Id. at 360.
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Electric & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.264 Judge Craven referred to

an "overlap" between rules 17(a) and 19 and analyzed the joinder issue under
both rules. 265 He stated, however, that:
Intended to expand the class of those who may sue to include persons
having an equitable or beneficial interest, the [real party in interest]
rule is unfortunately susceptible to efforts to prevent prosecution of
claims as illustrated by this appeal. Ingenious counsel are enabled to
present yet another "decision point" resulting in extravagant
expendi266
tures of time and effort before ever reaching the merits.

The idea that rule 17(a) requires joinder is altogether ill-conceived, 267 but
its emergence is not surprising. That the idea would arise in cases concerning
motions to join subrogated insurers as parties plaintiff is especially predictable.
To understand why the idea is wrong and to appreciate why it nevertheless has

occurred in this setting, a brief look at history is necessary.
At common law, partial assignees and subrogees were not permitted to sue

because the courts were reluctant to subject the debtor to more than one suit on
a single obligation. 2 68 The problem could not be solved by joinder because joinder of parties at common law was very limited. 269 Equity, however, allowed

liberal joinder of parties and had developed a doctrine of compulsory joinder-

"necessary" and "indispensable" parties-broader than that of the common

law.270 Equity, then, and later the Field Code, permitted partial assignees and
subrogees to sue in their own names (as "real parties in interest") because it was
possible to protect the debtor through compulsory joinder. 271 Thus, the "real
party in interest" rule did not in any sense require joinder. Rather, the rule itself
was made possible by the evolution of a distinct doctrine of compulsory joinder;
264. 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
265. Id. at 84-85; see also Prudential Lines, Inc. v. General Tire Int'l Co., 74 F.R.D. 474, 475
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting the "common purpose" of rules 17 and 19); White Hall Bldg. Corp. v.
Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (analyzing thejoinder
question under both rules), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1377 (3rd Cir. 1978) and aff'd mem. sub nom.
Quaglia v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 578 F.2d 1375 (3rd Cir. 1978).
266. VirginiaElec., 485 F.2d at 83 (citing J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW, THE CASE FOR RADICAL
REFORM 65 (1969)).
267. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42, § 1543 at 339 ("ITihe question of
who should or may be joined in the action must be determined under Rule 19 and Rule 20 rather
than Rule 17(a)."); Kennedy, supra note 2, at 680 ("Rule 17(a) should not be construed to compel
joinder without reference to Rule 19"); see also U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034,
1038 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Although the parties have addressed this problem solely in the context of
[federal rule] 17, we also must consider [federal rule] 19....
[rule] 17 governs only the right of
[plaintiff] to bring the suit. It is [rule] 19 that tells us whether the appropriate parties are before the
court."); Whitcomb v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.R.D. 244 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (rule 19 analysis, not rule
17(a), should be used to decide joinder issue); Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 11 (M.D.
Pa. 1977) (same).
268. See Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 266.
269. At common law, plaintiffs were compelled to join when their rights were "joint"; no other
joinder was permitted. C. CLARK, supra note 29, § 56, at 348-50.
270. See supra note 35.

271.

Splitting was never an objection in equity, since the additional parties might be cited

in, and with the freedom as to parties in equity incorporated in the codes, it cannot be an
objection under present practice. The insured may be made plaintiff or defendant; all interests may be determined in one action.
Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 273.
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to think of the real party in interest rule as a joinder rule introduces a redun272
dancy into the procedural system.
Perhaps because of the causal relationship between the real party in interest
rule and compulsory joinder, it is not surprising to find that discussions of partial subrogors and subrogees as "real parties in interest" invariably refer to compulsory joinder of these persons. 27 3 These discussions, however, have led to a
blurring of the distinction between these two doctrines. Most notably, in
Moore's FederalPractice,joinder of compensating insurers is discussed in the
section of the treatise on rule 17(a). Regarding partial subrogation, Professor
Moore stated, "There are two real parties in interest. Both may sue. But, as in
the case of partial assignments, if the defendant makes a timely objection, the
joinder of insurer and insured should be compelled." 2 74 Moore's treatment of
the compulsory joinder issue in his discussion of the real party in interest
rule, 275 without reference to rule 19 or the criteria and policies underlying com272. Doctrines of compulsory joinder from equity and code pleading were incorporated into
federal rule 19. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.909 (1987). In a recent article, Professor Bone
discusses the decision by the 1938 rules drafters to eschew a pragmatic approach and to include in
rule 19 the "conceptual baggage" of the late 19th century. See Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a
Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 110 (1989). Rule 19, as enacted in 1938, provided:
Necessary Joinder of Parties. (a) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23
and of subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and

be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a
plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary
plaintiff.
(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons who are not indispensable, but who ought
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have not
been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of
process and venue and can be made parties without depriving the court of jurisdiction of
the parties before it, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the action. The
court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such persons parties, if its
jurisdiction over them as to either service of process or venue can be acquired only by their
consent or voluntary appearance or if, though they are subject to its jurisdiction, their
joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it; but the judgment
rendered therein does not affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons.
(c) Same: Names of Omitted Persons and Reasons for Non Joinder to be Pleaded. In
any pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall set forth the names, if known to him,
or persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, but who are not joined, and shall state why they are omitted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 87, 87-88 (1966).
273. C. CLARK, supra note 29, § 24; Clark & Hutchins, supra note 32, at 271-72.
274. 2 J. MOORE & J.FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, § 17.08, at 2057. This passage appears without substantial change in the current edition of the treatise. See 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 43, %17.09[2.-1], at 17-78 to 17-79.
275. In the rule 19 section of Moore's 1938 treatise, there is no discussion of partial subrogation,
but only a citation to the rule 17(a) section in a footnote relative to partial assignment. 2 J. MOORE
& J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, § 19.03, at 2154 n.78. Professor Moore's treatise now includes in
the section on rule 19 a discussion of the overlap between rules 17(a) and 19, in which the writer
suggests that the matter is best treated under rule 19 and that, applying the criteria of rule 19(a) as
amended in 1966, joinder of the insurer should not be required. 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 43, 19.07-1[2.-2], at 19-113 to 19-116. Moore's comments favoring compulsory joinder, however, continue to appear in his chapter on rule 17(a) and to be cited for that approach
without reference to his discussion to the contrary in the section on rule 19. See Truckweld Equip.
Co. v. Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 649 P.2d 234, 237 (Alaska 1982).
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Once again, as discussed above with regard to the issue of identifying the

"real party in interest," the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Aetna

Casualty & Surety Co. 27 8 contributed to the problem. This time, the problem
was the Court's treatment of the joinder issue. After stating that both partial
subrogor and partial subrogee are real parties in interest under rule 17(a),2 79 the

Court noted tersely, "Although either party may sue, the United States, upon
timely motion, may compel their joinder. 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.) p.

1348. Both are 'necessary' parties. Rule 19(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'2 80 Although the Court did cite rule 19(b) for the joinder proposition, it
also cited Moore's discussion of rule 17(a). 28 1 More importantly, the Court offered no analysis of how the doctrine of compulsory joinder led to the conclusion

that subrogor and subrogee were "necessary" under rule 19.282 The cursory
nature of this discussion in Aetna contributed to the blurring of "real party in
interest" and compulsory joinder concepts. Aetna came to be widely cited, without any independent analysis of rule 19's application, for the proposition that a
partially subrogated insurer is a "real party in interest" whose joinder is
required.

283

276. Professor Bone refers to Professor Moore's treatment of compulsory joinder as "unusually
superficial." Bone, supra note 272, at 112. Bone states, "The bulk of Moore's discussion of Rule 19
in his 1938 treatise consists of a lengthy summary of existing precedent defining necessary and indispensable parties in different types of cases without any clear account of the purpose the Rule was
supposed to serve." Id. at 111.
277. One court, for instance, reasoned:
[A] partial subrogee is a real party in interest, under Rule 17(a), and as such has standing
to sue in his own name, subject only to the right of the defendant, by making timely objection, to insist upon the joinder of the other parties in interest in order to avoid a split-up of
the cause of action.
State Farm Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 737, 739 (1st Cir. 1949) (citing 2 J.
MOORE & J. FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, § 17.08).

278. 338 U.S. 366 (1949). See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
280. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 381-82 (citation and footnote omitted).
281. Id. at 382; see supra text accompanying note 280. Because the 1948 second edition of
Moore'sFederalPracticeis continuously updated, it is not possible to ascertain the exact language of
the passage referred to inAetna as "3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.) p. 1348." Seesupra note 117.
One can conclude, however, that the passage is Moore's discussion of rule 17(a), partial subrogation,
and compulsory joinder, see supra note 274 and accompanying text, because the current version of
Moore's treatise states that this discussion "was approved by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co." 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE supranote 43, 17.09[2.-1], at 17-77 n.l.
Moreover, Moore apparently did not discuss the relationship between rule 19 and compulsory joinder in his treatise until sometime after 1966. See supra note 275.
282. SeeAetna, 338 U.S. at 382; supra note 272 (text of rule 19 at the time of the Aetna decision).
With regard to the insurer-subrogee, the statement is entirely dictum, because the insurer was a
named plaintiff in all four of the cases before the Court. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
A number of federal courts, therefore, have declined to order joinder of partially subrogated insurers, distinguishing Aetna on the ground that the only issue even arguably before the Court was
compulsory joinder of the insured. See, eg., Prudential Lines, Inc. v. General Tire Int'l Co., 74
F.R.D. 474, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141, 144 (D.
Minn. 1957).
283. See, e.g., Gas Serv. Co. v. Hunt, 183 F.2d 417, 419 (10th Cir. 1950). Even after rule 19 was
extensively revised in 1966, courts continued to rely upon Aetna for the proposition that partially
subrogated insurers must be joined, rather than to apply Rule 19's stated criteria. See, e.g., Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 1973) ("It is clear that a
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The most serious blow to the distinction between rules 17(a) and 19 came in
the 1954 Fifth Circuit opinion in Celanese Corp. ofAmerica v. John ClarkIndustries, Inc.,284 discussed above in connection with loan receipts. 285 In Celanese
Judge Hutcheson first postulated 286 that the modem function of the real party in

interest rule is to prevent multiple litigation. Without citing any authority,
Judge Hutcheson wrote:

As appellant points out in its brief, the purpose of the practice long
obtaining in the federal courts and now set forth in Rule 17 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, is to enable the defendant to

avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against
the real party in interest, and to assure him finality of the judgment,

and that he will be protected against 2another
suit brought by the real
87
party at interest on the same matter.

Judge Hutcheson, however, had it all backwards. The real party in interest

rule would have created the problem of multiple litigation, had it not been for
the doctrine of compulsory joinder. It was the real party in interest rule that
permitted suit by both assignor and assignee on a partially assigned, or subro-

gated, claim. The protection that Judge Hutcheson found in the real party in
interest rule had been provided in equity and in the codes, not by the real party
in interest doctrine, but by the entirely separate doctrine of compulsory joinder,

which had been incorporated into rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
2 88
Procedure.
It is not surprising, however, that judges do see rule 17(a) as embracing
compulsory joinder principles. Without being both knowledgeable and conscious of the rule's history, a judge, predictably, is unlikely to accept that the
commanding language of the rule means so much less than what it seems to
say. 289 Judge Hutcheson's idea, nevertheless, became part of the legislative hispartial subrogee is a person to be joined if feasible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).") (citing Aetna, 338
U.S. at 381-82), cert denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974)); Wadsworth v. United States Postal Serv., 511
F.2d 64, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1975); Public Serv. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 467 F.2d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir.
1972); City Stores Co. v. Lerner Shops of D.C., Inc., 410 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wattles
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 82 F.R.D. 446, 448-49 (D. Neb. 1979); Chaplin v. Bruce, 57 F.R.D. 487,
488 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (citing Gas Serv. Co. and Public Serv. Co.); Neal v. Trim-Master Corp., 48
F.R.D. 392, 393-94 (N.D. Miss. 1969). But see Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 466 F.
Supp. 505, 511-12 (D.S.C. 1978) (criticizing Virginia Electric for "bypass[ing] the analysis provided
for in Rule 19(a)"); Bromac Elec. & Power Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox, 54 F.R.D. 486, 493 (D. Md.
1972) (rejecting reliance on Aetna because "that case was decided in 1949, long before Rule 19 was
amended and put in its present form emphasizing that pragmatic considerations should be controlling"); supra note 17 (citing cases that apply rule 19 to decide whether partially subrogated insurers
must be joined, but that do not agree upon the correct result).
284. 214 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1954).
285. See supra notes 211-61 and accompanying text.
286. C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 453 n.6.
287. Celanese, 214 F.2d at 556 (citation omitted).
288. See supra note 272.
289. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 412 ("[The rule] conveys a certain amount of correct informa-

tion about naming plaintiffs, but to the average reader innocent of history it probably suggests as

much or more that is quite incorrect.").
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tory of rule 17(a) in the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendment,
which states,
In its origin the rule concerning the real party in interest was permis-

sive in purpose: it was designed to allow an assignee to sue in his own
name. That having been accomplished, the modern function of the
rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the defendant against a
subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally
that the judgment will have its proper effect as res
290

judicata.

It is not surprising that the advisory committee so willingly accepted the idea
that rule 17(a) has this "modem function" of protecting a defendant from multiple litigation, because this is the advisory committee that extensively revised rule
291
19 with this same purpose in mind.
Perhaps no one familiar with the manner in which precedent evolves in the
290.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee note (1966) (emphasis added).

291. Regarding subsection (a)(1), the advisory committee note to the 1966 amendment of Rule
19 states, "The interests that are being furthered here are not only those of the parties, but also that
of the public in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter." FED. R. Civ. P. 19
advisory committee note (1966). In Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S,

102 (1968), the Court stated:
[T"here remains the interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies. We read the Rule's [19(b)'s] third criterion, whether the
judgment issued in the absence of the nonjoined person will be 'adequate,' to refer to this
public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible. . .
Id. at 111.
Rule 19 as amended in 1966 provides:
Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication. (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A
person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the
action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in
subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to
be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the
names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision (a) (1).(2) hereof
who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19, reprintedin 39 F.R.D. 87, 88-89 (1966) (In 1987, the rule was amended solely
for the purpose of "gender-neutralization.").
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hands of courts and writers should be surprised by the way in which Judge
Hutcheson's unsupported dictum about the function of rule 17(a) has spread
through the law of compulsory joinder like a fast-growing malignancy. In the
VirginiaElectric opinion, Judge Craven cited and relied upon both Celanese and
the 1966 Advisory Committee Note to rule 17(a) to support his statement regarding the joinder function of rule 17(a). 292 In its turn, the Carpetlandcourt
cited Virginia Electric as a case regarding rule 17(a) "as requiring the joinder of
293
real parties in interest independent of a Rule 19(a)(2) analysis."
Once a court, such as the one in Carpetland,has committed itself to a proposition anchored to unstable moorings, it often will seek to support the proposition with other equally vulnerable premises. The Carpetlandopinion is bloated
with questionable reasoning in support of its conclusion regarding the joinder
function of rule 17(a). Such reasoning is likely to broaden further the base of
support for the application of rule 17(a) as a rule of compulsory joinder.
To the plaintiff's argument that its insurer's compulsory joinder should be
determined solely by the requirements of rule 19(a),2 94 the Carpetland court
responded that it was bound by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Wadsworth v. United States Postal Service.295 The
Carpetland court described Wadsworth as holding that rule 17(a) is "an independent authority for compulsory joinder. ' 296 That conclusion, however,
vastly overstates the Wadsworth holding.
The Wadsworth case did hold that a partially subrogated insurer was subject to compulsory joinder, and, as pointed out by the Carpetlandcourt, Wadsworth did not discuss or apply the prerequisites of rule 19(a). Rather, the
Wadsworth court merely relied upon Aetna, 297 which, as further noted by the
Carpetland court, relied upon both rules 17(a) and 19. The Carpetlandcourt
then took Wadsworth's reliance upon Aetna, and its silence regarding amended
rule 19, to reach the "natural conclusion" that Wadsworth does not require the
prerequisites of rule 19(a) "to be satisfied before joinder is appropriate under
Rule 17(a)." 298 But of course the Aetna Court had not applied the rule 19(a)(1)
and (2) prerequisites that were added to the rule in 1966 because they were not,
299
at least explicitly, a part of the rule at the time of the Aetna decision.
The Carpetlandcourt stated that Wadsworth was "[tlaking Aetna's lead" by
292. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 84 nn. 11 & 12 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); see supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
293. Carpetland, U.S.A. v. J.L. Adler Roofing, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 357, 360 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
294. Id. at 359.
295. 511 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1975).
296. Carpetland,107 F.R.D. at 359-60.
297. Wadsworth, 511 F.2d at 65-67. Wadsworth itself overstated Aetna as holding that joinder of
the insurer is required. Id. at 66-67; see supranote 282; see also Bastian v. TPI Corp., 663 F. Supp.
474, 475-76 (N.D. 11. 1987) (reluctantly following Wadsworth).
298. Carpetland,107 F.R.D. at 360.
299. The advisory committee note to the 1966 amendment suggests that the criteria delineated in
the amended rule were not new, but that the old rule merely "was defective in its phrasing and did
not point clearly to the proper basis of decision." FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee's note
(1966).
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finding that rule 17(a) was a basis for joinder independent of rule 19(a). 300 In so

doing, Carpetlandconstrued the Aetna opinion as dispensing with prerequisites
in rule 19(a) that were not specified in the rule until seventeen years after the
opinion. Given that Aetna itself, in stating that joinder of the insurer was required, cited the version of rule 19 in effect at that time, 3° 1 Aetna cannot reason-

ably be read to mean that rule 17(a) alone requires joinder.
The Carpetlandcourt also cited several other decisions and Moore's Federal
Practice for the proposition that rule 17(a) is regarded as an independent basis

for joinder. 30 2 The cited cases were, however, like Wadsworth, cases in which
the courts merely relied upon Aetna, or upon other cases that in turn had relied
upon Aetna. The Carpetland court cited, for example, two opinions from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, PublicService Co. v. Black
& Veatch 303 and Gas Service Co. v. Hunt.3° 4 But Public Service Co. had relied

upon Aetna and Gas Service Co., which in turn was a pre-1966 case that had
merely followed Aetna. 30 5 The many cases both pre- and post-1966 that, like
Wadsworth, have found joinder required by reference to Aetna alone, without
analyzing rule 19,306 merely illustrate a judicial preference for precedent-even
questionable precedent--over the strictures of reasoning and analysis. 30 7 They
cannot fairly be taken to mean that rule 19 should be ignored in the context of
subrogated insurers.

The Carpetland court, quoting Aetna, also argued that rule 17(a) provides
an independent basis for compulsory joinder because

Rule 17(a) has a purpose that is not covered by the scope of Rule
19(a): to reveal to the factfinder all the "owners" of the claim sought.
"The pleadings should be made to reveal and assert the actual interest

of the 30
plaintiff,
and to indicate the interests of any others in the
8
claim."

The sentence from Aetna quoted by the Carpetlandcourt, however, immediately
300. Carpetland, 107 F.R.D. at 360.
301. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 382 (1949).
302. Carpetland, 107 F.R.D. at 360 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir.
1982); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Public Serv. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 467 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1972);
Gas Serv. Co. v. Hunt, 183 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1950)). The citation to Moore's FederalPracticeis to
the discussion of rule 17(a) in volume 3A, 17.09. As described supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text, Professor Moore's treatise contains a discussion of rule 17(a) that suggests that courts
should require joinder of a subrogated insurer, but a subsequently-added discussion of rule 19 concludes that courts should not require joinder. See 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43,
17.09[2.-1], at 17-78 to 17-79; 19.07-1 [2.-2], at 19-113 to 19-116.
303. 467 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1972).
304. 183 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1950).
305. See PublicServ. Co., 467 F.2d at 1144; Gas Serv. Co., 183 F.2d at 419-20. The Carpetland
court also cited Travelers Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1982), which had followed
Virginia Electric. Carpetland, 107 F.R.D. at 360.
306. See supra note 283.
307. See Smith, A Primerof Opinion Writing, ForFour New Judges, 21 ARK. L. REv. 197, 198200 (1967) (discussing the Grand Style and the Formal Style described in K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS

(1960)).

308. Carpetland, 107 F.R.D. at 360 (quoting Aetna, 338 U.S. at 382).
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follows the Aetna Court's citation to rule 19.309 Aetna's statement about what
the pleadings should reflect is not followed by any additional citation, much less
a citation to rule 17(a). The Aetna Court most likely was referring only to the
requirement in rule 19(c) that the pleadings set forth the names of persons who
3 10
ought to be parties, but who are not joined, and account for their nonjoinder.
Finally, the Carpetlandcourt discussed the situation in which joinder of an
insurer required by rule 17(a) might be impossible because the insurer is not
"subject to service of process" or because its presence would destroy subject
matter jurisdiction. 3 11 The court suggested that in the event of an inability to
join the insurer, one should return to rule 19 and apply subsection (b) to determine whether the case should proceed without the insurer. 312 The Carpetland
court thus is proposing a hybrid of rules 17(a) and 19 that is inconsistent with
the language and design of rule 19. The scheme of rule 19 is that subdivision (a)

provides the criteria for determining whether a nonparty is a person whose joinder should be required if feasible. Rule 19(b) then sets forth the criteria for the
court's decision whether to proceed without the nonparty or to dismiss the suit
"[ilf a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a
party." 3 13 Thus, the language of rule 19(b) limits its application to situations in
which subdivision (a) first has been applied and does not anticipate application
of subdivision (b)to deal with compulsory joinder arising from a source other
3 14
than rule 19(a).
This point illustrates a major problem with treating rule 17(a) as a rule of
compulsory joinder. Rule 17(a) conceived of as a compulsory joinder rule not
only overlaps and conflicts with rule 19, but it contains no criteria or guidance
for its application in fulfilling the purposes that Judge Hutcheson, the advisory
committee, and now Carpetlandhave grafted onto it.
What we see in Carpetlandis the cumulative effect of less than explicit rule
drafting, aggravated by and built upon less than fastidious judicial decisionmaking. The story begins with the cryptic texts of rules 17(a) and 19, themselves
embodiments of earlier and, to the modern lawyer, equally cryptic rules and
judicial decisions. 315 Added to that is Professor Moore's early treatment of
compulsory joinder of subrogated insurers in his discussion of rule 17(a) that
largely ignores the relationship of rule 19 to the problem. 3 16 His treatment was
then followed by Aetna, which referred to both rules, but treated the matter of
joinder very briefly, relying upon Moore and not engaging in any rule 19 analysis. 3 17 Then came those post-Aetna decisions, both before and after rule 19 was
309. Aetna, 338 U.S. at 382.
310. See supra notes 272 & 291.

311. Carpetland,107 F.R.D. at 361.
312. Id.

313.
314.
315.
316.

FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note (1966).
See Bone, supra note 272.
See 2 J. MOORE & . FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, § 17.08, at 2057; supra notes 274-76 and

accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text. State court decisions have also relied upon
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amended, that followed Aetna's dictum concerning absent insurers and eschewed any original rule 19 analysis for that problem.3 18 Finally, in Carpetland
all of this avoidance of the rule 19 analysis led to the abrogation of rule 19
altogether and the transformation of rule 17(a) into a rule of compulsory
3 19
joinder.
B.

Rule 17(a)'s "Exceptions" Clause as a Rule Excusing Joinder

A few federal decisions have held that although joinder of a subrogated
insurer otherwise might be required under rule 19 or the Aetna decision, the
"'exceptions" clause of rule 17(a) operates to permit the insured to sue alone. In
Shumate v. Wahlers320 a Michigan federal district court denied a defendant's
motion to order joinder of a workers' compensation carrier. The court relied
upon a Michigan statute permitting the employee to sue alone for itself and the
insurer, and the language of rule 17(a) that "a party authorized by statute may
sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
action is brought."'32 1 In response to the defendant's argument that joinder was
required by federal rule 19 because the employer and the insurer shared a "joint
interest," 322 the court stated that reliance on rule 19 was "not well
placed.., in
'32 3
view of the provisions of Rule 17(a) and of the state statute.
Similarly, in Jenkins v. Westinghouse Electric Co. 3 2 4 a Missouri federal district court found that under Missouri law, the employee was a trustee of an
express trust for the benefit of the workers' compensation carrier that had paid
benefits to the employee. 32 5 The court thus distinguished Aetna's apparent joinder requirement 32 6 by finding that the employee in this case was authorized by
"substantive local state law" to bring suit alone for the entire claim under the
provision of rule 17(a) that a" 'trustee of an express trust... may sue in his own
name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is
Aetna to convert rule 17(a) into ajoinder rule. For example, in Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mack Mfg.
Corp., 269 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954), the court stated,

Where the assignor has brought suit for the entire claim... the defendant would have the
right to insist upon application of the real party in interest rule, by moving that the assignee be made a party and assert his claim.... The view we here express is not materially

in conflict with the view expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States concerning
Section 17 (a) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in United States v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co....
Id. at 709-10 (citation omitted).
318. See supra note 283.
319. Carpetland U.S.A. v. J.L. Adler Roofing, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 357, 359-60 (N.D. I1. 1985).
320. 19 F.R.D. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
321. Id. at 176; see also King v. Cairo Elks Home Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 681, 683-86 (E.D. Ill.
1956) (following Shumate).
322. See supra note 272.
323. Shumate, 19 F.R.D. at 176.
324. 18 F.R.D. 267 (W.D. Mo. 1955). The author of the Jenkins opinion was District Judge
Charles E. Whittaker, who served on the United States Supreme Court from 1957 to 1962. Judge
Whittaker was also the author of Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp, 465
(W.D. Mo. 1955) (discussed supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text).
325. Id. at 270.
326. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
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brought.' "327
Other federal courts correctly have rejected the analysis suggested by Shumate and Jenkins.3 28 As discussed above, 329 the "exceptions" clause of rule
17(a) was included merely to clarify that "real party in interest" in the main part
of the rule does not necessarily refer to the beneficially interested party. The
purpose of the clause was to establish that although the rule might permit suit
by the holder of an equitable interest, it did not alter existing law allowing a
legal title holder to sue without joining beneficially interested persons who otherwise were not entitled to sue. The clause was not intended to excuse joinder of
persons who were entitled to sue and whose joinder might be required under
existing law. In the situations included in the original clause, the enumerated
persons whose joinder was not required-beneficiaries, legatees and distributees-were persons who had no right to sue under the substantive law.
If the insurers in Shumate and Jenkins actually were subrogated under state
law, it was incorrect for the courts to use the "exceptions" clause to treat them
as mere beneficiaries. As Professor Atkinson pointed out some years ago, the
idea of classifying an insured with an executor, administrator, and trustee as a
person who may sue without joining the person for whose benefit the action is
brought reveals an ignorance of the meaning of the real party in interest rule and

may cause this rule to alter substantive law. Thus, Professor Atkinson was
highly critical of New York's amendment of its real party in interest rule to
include in the second clause a person who executed "a loan or subrogation receipt, trust agreement or other similar instrument. '330 He wrote that the insured does not fit into the group named in the clause because
[i]t is the insurer who controls the action while in the other cases
within the exception clause the designated fiduciaries do, or at least
may, control the action. In other words the amendment authorizes a
name action, abolition of which was the real party in interest statute's
only real accomplishment. Furthermore, it is a use or name action
which does not disclose the usee's name-a hearkening back to 3the
31
ancient days before the assignee could sue in the assignor's name.
Decisions such as Shumate and Jenkins dilute and circumvent federal rule
19 by permitting state procedural rules of joinder to govern. Each court used
327. Jenkins, 18 F.R.D. at 270 (quoting rule 17(a)).
328. See, eg., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 814 (4th Cir. 1982) (provision of rule
17(a) that party authorized by statute may sue in own name without joinder of beneficial party "is
properly interpreted only as defining--either directly or by incorporation of state law-those persons
who, as real parties in interest, have substantive rights of action, and not as enabling those parties
then to avoid joinder of other parties in interest"); Neal v. Trim-Master Corp., 48 F.R.D. 392, 394
(N.D. Miss. 1969) (rejecting Jenkins); Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co., 37 F.R.D. 34, 37 (D. Md.
1965) (rejecting Shumate: "Plaintiffs' argument in regard to the effect of Rule 17(a) proceeds on the
erroneous basis that the enumeration of designated classes in the rule are exclusions from, rather
than illustrations of, the 'real party in interest' concept and ignores the effect of Rule 19."); Carlson
v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp. 692, 696 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (rejecting Shumate and

Jenkins).
329. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
330. Atkinson, supra note 2, at 946.
331. Id.
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the "exceptions" clause of rule 17(a) to excuse joinder of the insurer on the
ground that under state law the insured would have been permitted to sue
alone. 332 They, therefore, converted the "exceptions" clause, which was not intended to be an exception to anything, 333 into an exception to rule 19, and gave
state procedure a role it never should have had in federal courts.
Presumably, the drafters of rule 19 made every effort to articulate in that
rule every principle that is relevant to the issue of compulsory joinder. A court
should proceed on the assumption that the principles included in the rule accommodate every conceivable policy that is relevant. To engraft upon rule 17(a)
the Celanese-Carpetlandtreatment is, therefore, to threaten the integrity of rule
19's resolution of the competing policy considerations. Rule 17(a) is not a rule
of compulsory joinder, nor does the rule's "exceptions" clause excuse compulsory joinder required by rule 19. Courts, however, have held to the contrary
regarding both of these propositions. As long as rule 17(a) remains, such decisions may proliferate and, at the least, legal resources will be spent in debating
the points. Abolishing rule 17(a) will eliminate its interference with rule 19 and
compulsory joinder doctrine, and nothing will be lost.
VI.

RATIFICATION UNDER RULE

17(a)

Several federal district court decisions have seized upon the idea of ratification, which was incorporated in the new sentence that was added to rule 17(a) in
1966, as a solution to the problem of compulsory joinder of subrogated insur-

ers.3 34 Since 1966, the final sentence of rule 17(a) has provided:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such

ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the
been commenced in the name of the real party in
action had
335
interest.
In Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.336 a federal district court denied a
defendant's motion for compulsory joinder on the basis of the insurer's execution of a ratification agreement.3 37 The Stouffer court said that ratification
332. See supra text accompanying notes 320-27.
333. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.

334. See infra notes 336-44 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 85 (discussing state court
decision to same effect). Courts also have used ratification under rule 17(a) in cases dealing with
absentees other than subrogated insurers. See ICON Group, Inc. v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 829
F.2d 473, 477-78 (3d Cir. 1987); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.
1986); Urrutia Aviation Enters., Inc. v. B.B. Burson & Assoc., 406 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1969); National Safe Corp. v. Texidor Sec. Equip., Inc., 101 F.R.D. 467 (D.P.R. 1984); Clarkson Co. Ltd. v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 441 F. Supp. 792, 797-98 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Honey v. George Hyman Constr.

Co., 63 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (D.D.C. 1974) (suit by one subrogated insurer on behalf of others);

Southern Nat'l Bank v. TRI Fin. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173, 1186-88 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
335. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), reprintedin 39 F.R.D. 84 (1966); see generallysupra notes 63-91 and
accompanying text (discussing the 1966 amendment to rule 17(a)).
336. 88 F.R.D. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

337. Id. at 338. The Stouffer decision contains no description of the terms of the agreement.
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under rule 17(a) "must be considered as an alternative to joinder in this context."' 338 Regarding rule 19, the court first noted and approved the view that the
rule does not require joinder of the insurer, even when the insurer controls the
litigation. 339 Although it would appear that the court's disposition of the rule
19 problem made the ratification procedure superfluous, the court added that
ratification assured that joinder under rule 19(a) would not be required because
the defendant, by virtue of the agreement, was protected from multiple or incon-

sistent obligations.

34 °

In Hancotte v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 341 the same federal district court cited

Stouffer and denied a defendant's motion for joinder of the plaintiffs' partially
subrogated insurer because the insurer had executed a "ratification agreement"
with the plaintiffs in which the insurer had agreed to be bound by the results of

the action and to waive any right to pursue its subrogation rights outside that
action. 342 The court held that the existence of the ratification agreement effec-

tively disposed of the defendant's arguments for joinder under both rules 17(a)
and 19(a). Regarding rule 17(a), the court stated that ratification "affords the

defendant the same protection against subsequent actions that would be provided by Rule

17(a)."

343

Regarding rule 19(a), the court found that the ratifica-

of the defendant being subjected to
tion agreement eliminated "any danger
'344
multiple or inconsistent obligations."

There are several problems, both historical and practical, with using the
ratification language of rule 17(a) to solve the problem of compulsory joinder of

subrogated insurers. First, when a court requires the insurer to ratify the insured's action in lieu of compulsory joinder, 345 it is proceeding on the assumption that the insurer is a person whose joinder is required for a just adjudication.
It is far from settled, however, that the insurer would be subject to compulsory
joinder under the present rule 19. If the insured is a "real party in interest" with
regard to the entire claim, and if, as many cases hold, rule 19(a) does not require
joinder of the subrogated insurer, 346 there is simply no basis in the Federal
338. Id. at 337; see also Whitcomb v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.R.D. 244, 246 (M.D. Pa. 1978)

(ratification is alternative to dismissal under rule 17(a)).
339. Stouffer, 88 F.R.D. at 337-38.
340. Id. at 338. The ratification solution was also suggested by Edwards, Inc. v. Arlen Realty
and Dev. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 505, 512-13 (D.S.C. 1978), in which the court lamented that it was
bound to require joinder by the Fourth Circuit decision in Virginia Electric.
341. 93 F.R.D. 845 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
342. Id. at 846; see also Acme Markets, Inc. v. Shaffer Trucking, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 216, 217-18
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (following Hancotte and denying defendant's motion for joinder when insurer had
filed ratification affidavit with the court).
343. Hancotte, 93 F.R.D. at 846. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 40
(1982).
344. Hancotte, 93 F.R.D. at 847; see also Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 11-12 (M.D.
Pa. 1977) (subrogated insurer filed a "certificate authorizing plaintiff to prosecute the action 'for its
benefit' and agreeing to be bound by the results of the litigation"; consequently, insurer is not subject
to compulsory joinder under rule 19(a)).
345. Some federal courts have ordered that insurers file ratifications of the insureds' actions in
order to avoid the defendants' objections to nonjoinder of the insurers. See, e.g., James v. Nashville
Bridge Co., 74 F.R.D. 595, 597 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Pace v. General Elec. Co., 55 F.R.D. 215, 219
(W.D. Pa. 1972); In re Wuttke, 2 Bankr. 362, 364 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
346. See supra note 17.
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Rules of Civil Procedure for objection to a suit by the insured alone. There
would be, therefore, no basis for requiring ratification by the unnamed insurer.
Second, if rule 19 requires joinder of an insurer-subrogee, it is not clear that
ratification is in all respects a satisfactory alternative, although ratification probably means that the insurer will be bound by the judgment in the insured's action. 347 Status as a named party is significant not only for purposes of res
judicata, but also for the assessment of costs and sanctions, 348 application of
rules of discovery, 349 and the existence of diversity jurisdiction. 350 While a ratifier is not a formally named party, the ratifier may be in actual control of the
litigation. 351 The ratification then presents the court with a wide range of potential issues about the ratifier's duties and liabilities, as well as the effect of the
ratifier's presence on subject matter jurisdiction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the assessment of costs
and sanctions only against a "party. ' 352 An insurer that is permitted to ratify to
avoid joinder, therefore, is able to argue that, as a nonparty, it is not subject to
sanctions and costs. 353 Similarly, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure accord different treatment to parties and nonparties. 35 4 In
both Hancotte and Stouffer, the defendants argued that to facilitate discovery the
35 5
court should require joinder of the insurer.
347. This is particularly true when, as in the Hancotte case, the ratification agreement contains
not only the insurer's agreement to be bound by the judgment, but also a waiver of subrogation
rights outside that proceeding. Hancotte, 93 F.R.D. at 846. In Southern Nat'l Bank v. TRI Fin.
Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Tex. 1970), after noting that the absentee had asserted its agreement
to be bound by the judgment, the court observed, "A holding that this assertion will not suffice, but
that instead [the ratifier] must go to the expense and inconvenience of engaging counsel and entering
a formal appearance in this action, could not be reconciled with amended Rule 17(a), nor with the
general mandate of [federal rule] 1." Id. at 1188.
348. See infra notes 352-53 and accompanying text.
349. See infra notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
350. See infra notes 364-88 and accompanying text.
351. InHancotte the court described the ratification agreement as "authorizing plaintiffs to prosecute the action in [the insurers'] behalf." Hancotte, 93 F.R.D. at 846. Often, however, a subrogated
insurer will be in control of the litigation through the terms of the policy. See supra notes 101 & 10304.
352. In some instances courts may assess sanctions against attorneys as well. FED. R. Civ. P.
11, 16(f), 37.
353. See Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 649 P.2d 234, 238
(Alaska 1982) (joinder of insurer should be required because of Alaska's "broad costs and attorney's
fees provisions .... Where a party's claim is directly litigated before the courts of this state, we
believe that that party should bear the burdens as well as the benefits of the litigation.").
354. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
355. In Stouffer the defendant claimed that it was prejudiced because the plaintiff's insurer had
investigated the fire that gave rise to the suit and had control of the results of that investigation. The
court rejected this argument, noting that the plaintiff relied upon the same material, and that the
defendant was able to obtain discovery of the material. Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 88 F.R.D.
336, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In Hancotte the defendant asserted that it would be prejudiced by the
different treatments accorded parties and nonparties by the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The court responded that the defendant had articulated no specific instances of
denial of its requests for documents and that the plaintiffs and their insurer had agreed to respond to
all requests for discovery. Hancotte, 93 F.R.D. at 847; see also Blacks v. Mosley Mach. Co., 57
F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (defendant asserts that nonjoinder of insurer will be prejudicial to
defendant's ability to produce evidence). In Shepherd v. Castle, 20 F.R.D. 184 (W.D. Mo. 1957),
the defendant sought to take the deposition of the nonparty compensating insurer's claims adjuster
and the plaintiff asserted that the insurer "should be accorded all the rights and privileges which it
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Courts could resolve the problems of sanctions, costs, and discovery by re-

quiring that in ratifying the action, the insurer agree not only to be bound by the

judgment, but also to respond to discovery as a party356 and to be responsible

for sanctions and costs assessed against the plaintiff.357 This solution illustrates,
however, that one of the problems with the ratification option is that it has no

definition. The sole authority-for ratification is the single word included in the
1966 addition to rule 17(a). Nothing in the rule itself or in its legislative history
explains the scope of ratification. Neither the rule nor the advisory committee's

note addresses questions such as who controls the action and has settlement
authority; to what the ratifier must agree, when, and in what form; and to what
liabilities such as expenses, costs, attorney's fees, and burdens of discovery the

ratifier is subject.
These questions bring us to the historical reasons why ratification under

rule 17(a) is not a proper substitute for compulsory joinder. The rules drafters
had no particular definition of ratification in mind because the concept slipped

into rule 17(a) inadvertently. As discussed above, the idea of ratification was
borrowed from admiralty. 358 When the Advisory Committee on Admiralty

Rules drafted the amendment to rule 17(a) providing for relation back, it referred to "ratification, joinder or substitution '

359

to cure a defect in naming the

proper plaintiff. In admiralty, which did not have a "real party in interest" rule,
litigants commonly used ratification to specify the parties to the suit at some
point subsequent to the suit's commencement. 360 When, however, the provision
for relation back was accepted for all civil suits, not just admiralty, the word
"ratification" became part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 36 1
Ratification, of course, is completely inconsistent with the philosophy be-

hind the "real party in interest" rule, which commands that the party who has
the claim for relief shall be the named party who brings the suit. Moreover, the
use of ratification deliberately to avoid joinder is inconsistent with the advisory
could claim if named as a party in this action, because as a Workmen's Compensation insurer it is
financially interested in plaintiff's claim, as a cestui que trust, under Missouri law." Id. at 187.
356. See Clarkson Co. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 441 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (ratifying
entities agreed "to be bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of discovery in the
action"). Cf. United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1988) (ratifying
subrogated insurers were "co-plaintiffs" for purposes of attorney-client privilege, and apparently for
all other purposes).
357. See ICON Group, Inc. v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 829 F.2d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 1987), in
which the court stated that a "proper ratification" requires that the ratifying party authorize the
action and agree to be bound by its result, but that assumption of financial obligations was unnecessary in light of the interest and solvency of the named plaintiff.
Another problem is the proper role and responsibility of the ratifier under federal rule 16, which
authorizes the court to direct the appearances of "attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
parties" at pretrial and settlement conferences. FED. R. CIv. P. 16. Again, because the ratifier is not
a "party," but may be in control of the action, it is not clear whether the court has authority under
rule 16 to order the ratifier's participation. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871
F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (rule 16 does not limit district court's inherent authority to
require party represented by counsel to attend pretrial settlement conference).
358. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
359. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 79, at 341.
360. Id.
361. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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committee note, which states that the relation back provision of rule 17(a) is to

be used only in cases of "understandable mistake."'362 From the background of
rule 17(a) and its 1966 amendment, it appears most unlikely that the rules draft363
ers ever intended ratification to be used as it was in Hancotte and Stouffer.

Abolition of rule 17(a) would expunge the ratification device from the civil
rules. Short of abolition, however, the least that should be done is to delete the

word "ratification," leaving joinder or substitution as the only appropriate devices to correct a defect in naming the proper plaintiff.

VII. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND RULE 17(A)
In Navarro Savings Association v. Lee 364 the United States Supreme Court

alluded to "a 'rough symmetry' between the 'real party in interest' standard of
Rule 17(a) and the rule that diversity jurisdiction depends upon the citizenship
of real parties to the controversy." 365 Although the Navarro Court noted that

there are circumstances in which the inquiry into diversity of citizenship goes
beyond the parties named in the suit, 366 a general rule has been posited that
citizenship of the "real party in interest" under rule 17(a) is determinative in
367
deciding whether diversity jurisdiction exists.

362. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 336-44 and accompanying text. Nor does federal rule 25(c), governing
substitution of parties, permit these results. See supra note 192. Although rule 25(c) gives the district court discretion to permit an action to continue in the name of the original plaintiff when his
interest has been transferred to another, the rule appears to be limited to situations in which the
transfer took place after the filing of the suit, which is not likely to be the case in most insurance
subrogation situations. See FED. R. Civ. P. 25(c).
364. 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
365. Id. at 462 n.9. The Court in Navarro held that individual trustees of a Massachusetts business trust may invoke diversity jurisdiction on the basis of their own citizenship, regardless of the
citizenship of the trust beneficiaries. Id. at 465-66.
366. The Navarro Court observed,
But the two rules serve different purposes and need not produce identical outcomes in all
cases. ... In appropriate circumstances, for example, a labor union may file suit in its own
name as a real party in interest under Rule 17(a). To establish diversity, however, the
union must rely upon the citizenship of each of its members.
Id. at 462 n.9 (citing Note, Diversity Jurisdiction over UnincorporatedBusiness Entities: The Real
Party in Interest as a JurisdictionalRule, 56 TEx. L. REV. 243, 247-50 (1978)). See also Carden v.
Arkoma Associates, 110 S. Ct. 1015, 1021 (1990) (a federal court must look to the citizenship of a
partnership's limited, as well as its general, partners to determine whether there is complete diversity). Other circumstances recently have been mandated by Congress. In 1988 Congress amended
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to provide that
the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of
the same State as the decedent, and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent
shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or incompetent.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 202, 102 Stat. 4646 (1988)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982)). The idea for this legislation originated in the American Law
Institute. See 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42, § 1556, at 424 n.14. Similarly, section 1332(c)(1) provides that in a direct action against an insurer, the insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of the state of which the insured is a citizen, as well as the insurer's state of incorporation and principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1982). The Court recently held,
however, that when a liability insurer brings suit against a claimant, the "direct action" provision
does not apply and the citizenship of the insurer, not the insured, determines the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 110 S. Ct. 297, 299 (1989).
367. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42, § 1556, at 419. The general rule,
however, has become much less general in recent years. See supra note 366.
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When rule 17(a) is applied properly, this general rule produces results that
are consistent with principles of diversity jurisdiction, which in turn have devel369
368
and the complete diversity requirement.
oped from policies of federalism
These principles, like the real party in interest inquiry,3 70 focus not upon the
beneficially interested persons, but rather upon the person who is in actual control of the litigation. 371 Thus, whether diversity jurisdiction exists is generally
determined by the citizenship of the representative party, not by the citizenship
of those represented. Nominal or merely formal parties who have no interest are

ignored for purposes of determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. 372 A
representative is considered more than nominal if he has "actual powers with
regard to the matter in litigation"; without control over the litigation, the repre-

sentative "is a mere conduit through whom the law affords a remedy to persons
aggrieved, [and] the representative is treated as a nominal party.

'373

When rule 17(a) is not applied properly, however, the result can be that
these principles of diversity jurisdiction are abrogated. Virginia Electric & Power

Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.374 is a striking example of the manner in
which the manipulation of rule 17(a)'s bag of tricks can operate to evade the

policies reflected in the current congressional provision for federal jurisdiction
premised upon the diverse citizenship of the parties. As discussed above, in Vir-

ginia Electric the insurer had become subrogated to all but $150,000 of the
$2,200,000 claim and the insured had given the insurer "exclusive direction and
control" of the suit. 375 The court found that the insurer was a "real party in

interest," 376 but the insurer's joinder would have defeated diversity jurisdiction. 377 Dismissal was avoided, however, because the court concluded that, in
spite of the insurer's interest and control, the insured was a "real party in inter-

est" under rule 17(a) with regard to the entire claim asserted. 378 The court,

368. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 42, § 1556, at 711.
369. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
370. See supra note 42.
371. In Navarro, after noting that the beneficial shareholders "can neither control the disposition
of this action nor intervene in the affairs of the trust except in the most extraordinary situations,"
Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1980), the Court stated, "We conclude that
these respondents are active trustees whose control over the assets held in their names is real and
substantial.... They have legal title; they manage the assets; they control the litigation. In short,
they are real parties to the controversy." Id. at 465 (emphasis added). Cf. Broyles v. Bayless, 878
F.2d 1400, 1405 (11th Cir. 1989) (uninsured motorist carrier is not a "real party in interest" for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction when it exercised no substantial control over the defense of the
action).
In Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 110 S. Ct. 1015, 1020-21 (1990), the Court rejected control as
the criteria for ascertaining diversity when a limited partnership is a party. The Court distinguished
Navarroon the ground that Navarro concerned trustees as parties and it did not address the citizenship of an artificial entity. Id. at 1020.
372. 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 43,
17.04, at 17-16 to 17-17; 13B C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3606 (1984).
373. 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 372, § 3606, at 418 (citing Coal Co.
v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172, 177 (1870)).
374. 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
375. Id. at 81-82.
376. Id. at 83.
377. Id. at 85.
378. Id. at 84.
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therefore, permitted the suit to proceed in the name of the insured alone, with-

379
out joinder of the insurer.

In light of the insurer's complete control of the Virginia Electric litigation,
the plaintiff insured was, for the lion's share of the claim asserted, "a mere conduit through whom the law affords a remedy to persons aggrieved. 38s0 With
regard to the portion of the claim in which the insured had a pecuniary interest,
the insured was in the position of a party being represented, entitled to benefit
from another's conduct of the litigation. The court, however, analyzed only
rules 17(a) and 19 and never addressed the application of principles of diversity
3 1
jurisdiction to the case before it. 8
Thus, in the Virginia Electric case, a misapplication of rule 17(a) allowed
the litigation in federal court of a two million dollar claim between nondiverse
parties on the basis of the citizenship of a merely nominal representative. This
was a complete abrogation of principles of diversity jurisdiction and the complete diversity requirement, which might not have occurred if there were no rule
17(a). Without the real party in interest rule, the court might have been forced
to respond to the defendant's assertion that the insurer's interest defeated diversity by proceeding directly to the jurisdictional policies that ought to have governed. These principles then would have led the court to the correct result with
regard to both the identity of the proper plaintiff and the diversity question.
Furthermore, as described above, there are numerous cases in which judicial misunderstanding of rule 17(a) has led to decisions in which the "real party
in interest" has been determined by state procedural rules.3 82 But as one treatise
observes:
If diversity jurisdiction could be destroyed as the result of state procedural rules, the primary objective of diversity jurisdiction-protecting
out-of-state litigants from the possibility of local prejudice-would be
frustrated. Conversely, if diversity jurisdiction were created as the result of state procedural rules, actions that properly belong in state
courts would be tried in federal courts, thereby expanding the limited
jurisdiction of the national courts and interfering38with
the proper allo3
cation of judicial business in our federal system.
When courts apply rule 17(a) correctly, of course, the rule does no violence to
federal jurisdiction because the proper plaintiff under that rule will be, in most
3 84
cases, the party whose citizenship should be controlling.
379. See supra notes 178-94 and accompanying text.
380. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 372, § 3606, at 418 (citing Coal

Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172, 177 (1870)); see supra text accompanying note 373.
381. Virginia Elec., 485 F.2d at 85-86.
382. See supra notes 196-261 and accompanying text.
383. 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 372, § 3606, at 418-19.
384. With regard to unincorporated associations and representatives of infants, incompetents,
and decedents' estates, however, the correct party plaintiff under rule 17(a) is not the party whose
citizenship controls for diversity purposes. See supra note 366. In these situations, there is not even
a "rough symmetry" between rule 17(a) and diversity determinations, see supra text accompanying
note 365, and rule 17(a) simply is irrelevant in ascertaining jurisdiction.
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The newly discovered device of ratification under rule 17(a), 38 5 however,
presents a danger that more courts will determine diversity jurisdiction without
examining the real interests at issue in the suit. If courts do not consider a
ratifier's citizenship in determining diversity, insurers may be able to preserve or

destroy diversity at will by choosing between ratification and joinder in the insured's action. This development would violate the admonition in Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 82 that "[the federal] rules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
therein.

'38 6

A further evasion of congressional policy may occur if the diverse insured's

pecuniary interest does not exceed the minimum jurisdictional amount, 387 but

the suit proceeds in the name of the insured alone for an entire claim that exceeds the minimum, with the insurer as ratifier. In that event, federal jurisdiction would be created by considering the insurer's portion of the claim for
purposes of meeting the jurisdictional amount, but ignoring the ratifying insurer
for purposes of complete diversity. 388 Regarding federal jurisdiction and the

insurer's role in the suit, the plaintiffs truly would have it both ways.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
When the real party in interest rule was abolished in New York in 1963, a

report to the legislature explained that the rule should be eliminated
for the following reasons: (1) it is unnecessary since the law would be
the same without any express rule, (2) it is an inept statement of an

obvious principle of substantive law, (3) it misleadingly seems to say
that the action must be brought by the party to be benefited, and (4)
the second part of the section is not an exception to the first part as
389
therein stated.
390
All of these reasons also support abolition of federal rule 17(a).
The federal rule, moreover, suffers from judicial interpretations converting
385. See supra notes 334-63 and accompanying text.
386. FED. R. Civ. P. 82. One might assert that the court must consider the ratifier's citizenship
to avoid a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1359, which provides that, "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982). Professor Moore notes, however, that "where either the subrogor or subrogee brings suit alone without
joinder of the other, and the non-joined party's citizenship would destroy diversity, the arrangement
by which the choice is made is rarely found to be collusive." 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 43, 17.05(13.-1], at 17-34.
387. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1989).
388. In Continental Bus Systems, Inc. v. Rohwer, 172 F. Supp. 487 (D. Col. 1959), the court
ordered joinder of the subrogated insurer and held that the claims of insured and insurer would be
aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount. The court stated that " '[t]he several plaintiffs...
have united "to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common and undivided interest";
so "it is enough if their interest collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.'" Id. at 490 (quoting
Farren v. Gas Serv. Co., 122 F. Supp. 536, 537-38 (D. Kan. 1954)).
389. ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FIRST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

OF 1957, No. 6(B), at 33 (1957), quoted in N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 1004 (McKinney 1976), Legislative Studies and Reports.
390. See supra notes 107-261 and accompanying text.
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it into a redundant and ambiguous rule of compulsory joinder.3 9 1 It also is en-

cumbered by the 1966 amendment that introduced the device of ratification,
3 92
which is completely at odds with the original intent of the rule itself.

The need to eliminate federal rule 17(a) becomes even more apparent when
one considers the impact on federal diversity jurisdiction of erroneous determinations of the proper plaintiff. 39 3 Even when jurisdiction is not at issue, naming
of the proper party plaintiff is important in federal courts because the person

actually in control of the litigation should be subject to the responsibilities of a
394
"party" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Concerns about juries' prejudicial reactions to insurance company plaintiffs
should be addressed as problems of trial procedure and evidence, not as
problems of the "real party in interest. ' 395 Such concerns should not be allowed
to interfere with the policies that are enforced by requiring the naming of proper
plaintiffs.
Nothing will be lost if rule 17(a) is eliminated. Rule 12(b)(6) is a clearer
and more direct device for determining whether the named plaintiff should be
allowed to proceed with the action. 39 6 Using rule 12(b)(6) for this purpose has
the advantage of directing attention to the applicable substantive law, in many
instances that of a particular state, which ought to be, but currently often is
391. See supra notes 262-333 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 334-63 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 364-88 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 49; see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (requiring that "[iln the complaint the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties"); National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th
Cir. 1989) (citing rule 10(a), the court sua sponte dismissed the claims of unnamed plaintiffs who had
not sought permission to proceed anonymously, and stated that "the federal courts lack jurisdiction
over the unnamed parties, as a case has not been commenced with respect to them").
395. See supra note 9. Joinder of an insurer as a party plaintiff does not necessarily mean that
the jury must be informed of the presence of the insurer as a claimant. There is a difference between
what must be in a pleading and what must be revealed to a jury. See Kessner, FederalCourtInterpretations of the Real Party in Interest Rule in Cases of Subrogation, 39 NEB. L. REv. 452, 472
(1960). Even in those jurisdictions in which the jury may examine the pleadings, it is not necessary
that all matters in the pleadings be revealed to the jury. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-9-302
(1980) (counsel may read "his entire declaration" to the jury); id. § 29-26-117 (notwithstanding the
provisions of§ 20-9-302, the plaintiff's demand for a specific sum "shall not be disclosed to the jury"
in a medical malpractice action). But see Carchidi v. Rodenhiser, 209 Conn. 526, -, 551 A.2d
1249, 1253 n.7 (1989) (Connecticut bars requests for a specific amount of damages in complaints,
which jurors are permitted to examine).
Professor Kennedy, favoring full disclosure of subrogation interests to the jury, suggested that
the Aetna Court's statement that the pleadings should reveal and assert the actual interests of the
plaintiff and others requires jury disclosure. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 715-16 & n.176. His suggestion probably reads too much into the Court's statement. See supra notes 308-310 and accompanying text.
Even if the jury is aware of the insurer's interest, federal courts commonly deal with such
problems with cautionary instructions. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 105. Professor Atkinson suggests
that
it may well be that the best solution of the problem, regardless of whether an insurer is a
party or not, is that the court should caution the jurors that either party or both may be
protected by insurance with which the jury has nothing to do, and that their job is to
determine the defendant's liability upon the basis of fault.
Atkinson, supra note 2, at 944.
396. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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not, 397 the central inquiry in ascertaining the proper plaintiff. With regard to
those persons not named as plaintiffs, it is the proper function of rule 19 to
determine whether there are additional plaintiffs who should be joined if the
action is to be allowed to proceed. Finally, the relation-back function of the
1966 amendment to rule 17(a) can be both preserved and clarified by using rule
15(c) to determine when courts should allow amendment and relation back.398
In 1967, Professor Kennedy wrote that rule 17(a) is a "barnacle on the
federal practice ship."' 399 Since that time, rule 17(a) has developed in such a
way that it has become, in today's imagery, a computer virus in the systems of
federal procedure and jurisdiction. The rule has expanded into areas in which it
does not belong, interfering with the operation of other rules and policies, and
contributing nothing itself to the successful operation of the program.

397. See supra notes 141-261 and accompanying text. Use of rule 12(b)(6) also eliminates any
ambiguity about the timing of an objection to the proper plaintiff. See supra note 48.
398. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
399. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 724.
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